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CONFLICTS - INSURANCE - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
- LIMITED REN VOI EXCEPTION WILL BE UTILIZED
WHEN LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS INDICATES THAT
FOREIGN JURISDICTION WOULD APPLY MARYLAND
LAW TO SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE. American Motorists
Insurance Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d
1295 (1995).
I. INTRODUCTION
Toxic industrial waste dumps represent one of the greatest mod-
ern hazards to the environment in our country.' By one count, there
are approximately 30,000 such sites in the United States, ranging
from large commercial dumps to one or two barrels of waste depos-
ited on a roadside. 2 The cost of cleaning up these toxic waste sites
is as staggering as their number: it has been estimated that as much
as five hundred billion dollars is required just to remedy contami-
nation at the 10,000 most heavily contaminated dumps.' As a result,
a flood of litigation to determine liability for remedial efforts has
ensued between insurers who issued comprehensive general liability
(CGL) policies to commercial and industrial polluters, and the insured
businesses whose products and wastes have contaminated soil and
groundwater. 4 In American Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA
Group, Inc. (American Motorists),' the Court of Appeals of Mary-
land addressed the increasingly litigated issue of insurance liability
for environmental remediation efforts while at the same time adding
a new wrinkle to the classic legal conundrum of conflict of laws.
In 1991, American Motorists Insurance Co. filed a declaratory
judgment action against ARTRA Group, Inc. to determine its duty
to defend ARTRA in a suit filed by the purchaser of ARTRA's
former manufacturing facility.6 The new owner had sued ARTRA to
recover the costs of remedying extensive pollution at the facility,
1. See generally Charles Child, The Waste of Superfund, CRAJN's DET. Bus.,
Feb. 16, 1989.
2. See id. at 22.
3. See id.
4. See infra notes 41, 42 and accompanying text.
5. 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
6. See id. at 563-64, 659 A.2d at 1296-97.
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which had allegedly occurred over a period of decades as a result of
the plant's normal business practices.7
The American Motorists court stated, in dicta, that an exception
to Maryland's settled contractual conflict-of-laws doctrine of lex loci
contractuss would exist when a contract is formed in a state whose
courts would apply the law of Maryland as the state with the most
significant contacts to the litigation. 9 The court of appeals further
noted that an insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify an insured
against the costs of cleaning up longstanding environmental contam-
ination under a CGL policy which contained a pollution exclusion
clause precluding all coverage except where the release of pollutants
is "sudden and accidental."' 0
The court of appeals's treatment of the conflict of laws and
insurance issues is both noteworthy and troubling. The American
Motorists court's holding on conflict of laws suggests that the court
may be contemplating a change from Maryland's adherence to lex
loci contractus. 11 More importantly, although the court of appeals
stated that its adoption of renvoi, 2 a controversial conflict-of-laws
doctrine, promotes the conflict-of-laws goals of "simplicity, predict-
ability, and uniformity," 3 the holding is not a step towards adoption
of a modern approach to contractual choice of law theory. 14 It is
instead merely a loophole to justify the application of Maryland law
when lex loci contractus prescribes otherwise. 5
The court of appeals's adoption of a narrow construction of the
"sudden and accidental" pollution exclusion exception to CGL pol-
icies brings Maryland into line with the majority of state and federal
7. See id. at 564, 590-93, 659 A.2d at 1296-97, 1307-09.
8. Lex loci contractus literally means "the law of the place of contracting." 15A
CJ.S. Conflict of Laws § 11(1) (1967). The term more specifically describes
several methods of determining which jurisdiction's law should be applied. See
infra notes 100-08, 122 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of lex
loci contractus.
9. See id. at 573, 659 A.2d at 1301.
10. See id. at 590-93, 659 A.2d at 1310-11.
11. Lex loci contractus and more recent choice-of-law theories are discussed more
fully infra notes 99-115 and accompanying text.
12. Renvoi is a controversial conflict-of-laws doctrine under which the court
deciding a case adopts the choice-of-laws principles of another jurisdiction for
purposes of determining the applicable substantive law. Renvoi is discussed
more fully infra notes 139-72 and accompanying text.
13. American Motorists, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
14. See id. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305. The court's position that lex loci contractus
is an outdated doctrine and is no longer appropriate in all factual settings is
discussed infra notes 214-16 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 107,
122-38 and accompanying text for a discussion of exceptions to the principle
of lex loci contractus.
15. See infra notes 241-44.
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courts which have recently decided this issue. 6 It is not what the
court said, but rather what it failed to address, that makes this
decision vexatious; the court of appeals did not consider the drafting
history of the policy language, which is inconsistent with the insurer's
claim that the "sudden and accidental" exception precludes coverage
except where the polluting event is of a short-lived or instantaneous
nature. 17
II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Policies
1. An Introduction to Liability Insurance
Insurance is based on the theory of buying and selling contingent
or unknown risks. 18 When an insurance policy is sold, the contingent
risk of loss is transferred from the insured to the insurer.' 9 Liability
insurance is a contractual undertaking by which the insurer agrees
to defend and indemnify the insured against the contingent risk of
liability for damages resulting from bodily injury or injury to the
property of others. 20 An insurer's duty to defend arises when suit is
filed against an insured by a tort plaintiff who alleges injuries or
damages which are within, or "potentially within," the scope of the
policy's coverage.2' When this "potentiality of coverage" exists, the
16. See infra note 55.
17. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 586-93, 659 A.2d at 1308-11. The court
of appeals based its opinion on whether ambiguity existed in the phrase "sudden
and accidental" and did not address the issue of the intent of the insurance
iidustry in adopting this language. See id.; see also infra notes 34-69.
18. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 2 (1993) (defining insurance as a contractual
undertaking by one party to indemnify another against "loss, damage, or
liability" stemming from a contingent event).
19. See id. Insurance involves a contingent risk of loss borne by one party being
transferred to another party, and that risk being distributed among "similarly
situated individuals." Id.
20. See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 9 (1993). The duty to defend arises as a result of
the insurer's contractual promise to do so in the insurance policy. See Andrew
Janquitto, Insurer's Duty to Defend in Maryland, 18 U. BALT. L. REv. 1, 3-
4 (1988). Not all liability policies provide a duty to defend; some types of
liability policies provide only liability coverage. See id. When the insurance
policy provides a duty to defend, the insurer must defend against or pay any
claim within the coverage of the policy. See id.
21. See Chantel Assocs. v. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co., 338 Md. 131, 656 A.2d
779 (1995); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 651 A.2d 859
(1995); see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d
1204, 1220 (Ill. 1992).
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insurer is obligated to defend the insured in the litigation and
indemnify the insured for any costs incurred as a result.2
2. The Insurer's Duty to Defend
Generally, an insurer's defense duty is broader than its indem-
nification duty. 23 In Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co.,24 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the obligation of an insurer
to defend its insured under a contract provision is determined by the
allegations of the tort action. 25 If the tort-plaintiff alleges to have a
claim covered by the policy, the insurer's duty to defend arises. 26
Even if the alleged facts are not clearly within the policy coverage,
the insurer must still defend the insured if the claim may potentially
be covered by the policy. 27 A potentiality of coverage exists if the
insured establishes that there is a "reasonable potential that the issue
triggering coverage will be generated at trial.' '
Comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies are general lia-
bility policies designed to protect businesses against any contingent
risks of loss which may arise as a result of normal operations and
which may, as a result, jeopardize a business' financial stability.29
22. See Chantel, 338 Md. at 138, 656 A.2d at 784; Janquitto, supra note 20, at
2-3.
23. See Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1220. The insurer will be obligated to
defend claims which either definitely or potentially fall within its scope of
coverage. See Janquitto, supra note 20, at 2.
24. 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
25. See id. at 407-08, 347 A.2d at 850.
26. See id. at 407, 347 A.2d at 850.
27. See id. The "potentiality" rule created by the Brohawn court implies that only
when the insurer can show conclusively as a matter of law that there is no
possible factual or legal basis through which the insurer's duty to indemnify
may arise will the insurer be relieved of the duty to defend. See Janquitto,
supra note 20, at 15. Although commonly referred to as liability insurance,
policies which specify a duty of the insurer to defend the insured also provide
"litigation insurance" to protect the policyholder from the cost of defending
adverse legal actions. See Brohawn, 276 Md. at 410, 347 A.2d at 851. Under
the Brohawn and Outboard Marine holdings, the insurer would be liable for
defense of claims for which if the defense is successful it will not become
obligated to pay. See Janquitto, supra note 20, at 13-14 (stating insurer is
obliged to defend even bad-faith claims filed solely to raise potentiality of
coverage).
28. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Cochran, 337 Md. 98, 111-12, 651 A.2d 859, 866
(1995).
29. See Nancer Ballard & Peter M. Manus, Clearing Muddy Waters: Anatomy of
the Comprehensive General Liability Pollution Exclusion, 75 CORNELL L. REv.
610, 620-21 (1990).
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3. History and Construction of the Pollution Exclusion Clause
and the "Sudden and Accidental" Exception
Standard-form CGL policies are drafted by the Insurance Serv-
ices Office (ISO). 30 Those policies issued from 1973 to 1985 generally
excluded coverage for pollution releases unless the release was "sud-
den and accidental." 3' Typically found as exclusion "f" in the
standard ISO policy form,32 the exclusion clause precluded coverage
for:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the dis-
charge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids or gases, waste
materials or other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into
or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental 33
The apparent intent of the insurance industry in drafting this
clause was to eliminate coverage for damages caused by intentional
or expected discharges of hazardous material during the normal
course of business3 4 Whether the drafters intended to preclude cov-
erage for unintentional releases or merely unintentional damages
remains unclear. 35 It appears, however, that the insurance industry
did not consider limiting coverage to accidental releases of short
duration. 6 As such, two legal interpretations of "sudden and acci-
30. See id. at 621. The ISO is a trade organization for the insurance industry and
serves the industry by drafting standardized policy forms and obtaining the
approval required for the issuance of its forms from governmental regulatory
agencies. See id.
31. See id. at 612.
32. See id. at 612-13.
33. See id. at 613; see also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc.,
338 Md. 560, 564-65, 659 A.2d 1295, 1297 (1995).
34. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 625-26. The explanatory memoranda
provided to state insurance regulators in 1970 by the Insurance Rating Board
(IRB) and the Mutual Insurance Rating Bureau (MIRB), two insurance industry
associations tasked with drafting policy language, suggested that the primary
purpose of exclusion "f" was to preclude liability only for pollution related
injuries that were intended or expected. See id.
35. See id. at 625-27.
36. See supra note 34. This explanatory memorandum was described as a "paradigm
of ambiguity," because the IRB and MIRB stated that the purpose of the
exclusion was to preclude coverage in cases where the injuries resulting from
the pollution were intended or expected, while the exclusion clause itself referred
to the releases of pollution, not to the damages or injuries resulting from the
releases. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 626. The confusion and lack
of clarity in the insurers' purpose in adopting this clause has led to confusion
over whether the insurance industry meant to cover releases of pollution that
1996l
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dental" have evolved.37 Under the "unintentional and unexpected"
view, discharges of pollutants which are merely unintended and
unexpected, such as the gradual pollution by leakage of toxic wastes
into the ground, will be covered. 3" If "sudden" is construed to have
a temporal element of abruptness or swiftness, however, coverage
for damages resulting from such gradual releases is precluded.39
Enforcement of environmental laws such as the Comprehensive
Environmental Response and Liability Act (CERCLA)40 by federal,
were unintentional, or merely to cover releases of pollution where the damages
were unintentional. See id. at 626-27. The lack of clarity also created a problem
in situations where the policyholder had intentionally discharged waste, but
without intention to cause, or expectation of causing, environmental damage.
See id. at 625-27. In its focus on intentional versus unintentional discharges
and damages, the insurance industry failed to consider whether or not the
pollution exclusion should preclude coverage except where the releases of
pollution were of a temporal nature. See id. at 627. But see infra note 68
(discussing Supreme Court of New Jersey's holding that clause must be con-
stmed in manner consistent with which it was presented to state insurance
regulators).
37. See supra notes 44-91.
38. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 633-34. Courts deciding early cases
involving the "sudden and accidental" clause read it expansively and held that
damages which resulted from pollution releases were not excluded from coverage
as long as the releases were merely "unexpected and unintended." See, e.g.,
Lansco, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super.
CL Ch. Div. 1975) (holding that an oil spill presumably caused by vandalism
and neither expected nor intended by the insured was sudden and accidental
within meaning of exclusion clause), aff'd, 368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1976); Farm Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bagley, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294
(N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (holding coverage not precluded by "sudden and
accidental" exception where insured intentionally sprayed chemicals on his land
and chemicals traveled through air to land on adjoining property, causing
damage thereto); see also Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 633-35. Some
courts went even further, reading the exception statement as requiring coverage
where merely the damage, rather than the release of pollution, was "unintended
and unexpected." See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 637-38. In doing
so, these courts held that the exclusion clause was simply a restatement of the
term "occurrence." See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Util. Auth. v. Hartford
Accident & Indem. Co., 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982); see
also Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 637-38. According to Ballard &
Manus, an occurrence is an accident or unintended, sudden, unexpected event
which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage
neither expected nor intended by the insured. See Ballard & Manus, supra note
29, at 623-24. In essence, these holdings were tantamount to the exception
swallowing the exclusion clause. See id.
39. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 638-40. During the past ten years,
courts have taken a more restrictive approach to this issue, holding that coverage
was precluded when the release of pollution was not of a temporal nature. See
id. But see infra note 42 for a description of a possible reconciliation between
the two interpretations of "sudden."
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9622 (1994); see also infra note 181 (discussing applicable
Maryland environmental protection statutes).
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state, and local governments has led to costly remediation efforts on
the part of CGL policyholders. 41 As a result, a nationwide barrage
of litigation has ensued between insureds and insurers concerning
liability for environmental remediation costs under CGL policies, 42
much of it surrounding the interpretation of this exception to the
pollution exclusion clause.
43
4. Court Interpretations of "Sudden and Accidental": "Abrupt"
or "Instantaneous" versus "Unintended and Unexpected"
There is a difference of opinion as to whether the word "sud-
den," as used in the context of the pollution exclusion clause, has
temporal meaning." The Supreme Court of Illinois, in Outboard
Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 45 held that the term
41. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 611. Individuals and corporate entities
who must pay for the remedying of environmental misdeeds occurring years
ago are attempting to hold insurers liable under policies which covered those
years. See id. at 612.
42. See id. at 612-13. In terms of furthering the goals of liability insurance, an
interpretation of the exclusion which provides coverage for unintended and
unexpected pollution releases is consistent with the general principles of business
liability insurance: to provide coverage for unintended and unexpected acts
which lead to liability of the policyholder, and thereby threaten its financial
stability while excluding coverage for losses or damages resulting from acts
intended or expected to cause loss or damage. See id. at 628-29.
Ballard and Manus have also suggested a possible reconciliation of "sudden"
and "gradual," arguing that these two words are not antonyms as frequently
asserted by the insurers. See id. at 619-20. Instead, both terms may describe
an event which has an unanticipated beginning but thereafter progresses grad-
ually, such as a "sudden illness." See id.; see also Morton Int'l Inc. v. General
Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 871 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 510
U.S. 112 (1994).
43. See supra note 39.
44. The term "sudden" has been held ambiguous and to mean "unintended" or
"unexpected" by the highest courts of Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, New Jersey,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Hecla Mining Co. v.
New Hampshire Ins. Co., 811 P.2d 1083, 1087 (Colo. 1991); Claussen v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 380 S.E.2d 686, 688 (Ga. 1989); Outboard Marine Corp. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218-20 (Ill. 1992), modified, 670
N.E.2d 740 (Ill. 1996); Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of
Am., 629 A.2d 831, 847-48 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 112 (1994);
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 882 P.2d 703, 721 (Wash.
1994), modified, 891 P.2d 718 (Wash. 1995); Joy Techs., Inc. v. Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co., 421 S.E.2d 493, 497-500 (W. Va. 1992); Just v. Land Reclamation,
Ltd., 456 N.W.2d 570, 573-74 (Wis. 1990); see also Cincinnati Ins. Co. v.
Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 151 (7th Cir. 1994). But see
infra note 55 for a listing of states and federal courts which have held the
exclusion exception to be unambiguous.
45. 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992).
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"sudden" was ambiguous. This case involved allegations of envi-
ronmental contamination resulting from frequent spills and leaks of
contaminants into lakes and streams occurring over a 13-year period.4 7
The Outboard Marine court noted that the dictionary definition of
the word "sudden" was both "unforeseen" and "unexpected" as
well as "abrupt, rapid, or swift."48 The court also stated that other
state and federal courts were divided on the issue of whether sudden
meant "abrupt" or "unintended and unexpected." 49 The court con-
cluded that since "sudden" was ambiguous, it must be construed in
favor of the insured. 0 "Sudden" was therefore construed to mean
"unintended or unexpected." 5
The Outboard Marine court also held that since an accidental
release or discharge was defined by the policy as a "continuous or
repeated release," a gradual release of a continuous or repeated
nature would be an accidental release or exposure.5 2 The court
concluded that when the policy was viewed as a whole, the intent of
the contracting parties was that the policy's coverage would protect
the insured from liability for damages arising from unexpected or
unintended releases of pollution, including those that may have been
continuous." The court held that the insurer had a duty under the
policy to defend the insured against damages suits filed by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and by state officials
if it was possible that at least some of the releases could be considered
unexpected and unintended.5 4
46. See id. at 1218.
47. See id. at 1208, 1213-14.
48. See id. at 1218.
49. See id. ; see also supra note 44; infra note 55.
50. See Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1218. It is a general principle of law that
ambiguities in a written contract are always construed against the party which
drafted the contract. See, e.g., id. at 1212-13; Sullins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 340
Md. 503, 667 A.2d 617 (1995) (holding Maryland follows same principle).
51. See Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1218.
52. See id. at 1219.
53. See id. The Outboard Marine court concluded that a definition of "sudden"
in the context of the pollution exclusion clause would be inconsistent with the
policy as a whole because an "occurrence," the event triggering coverage, was
defined in the policy as "an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure
to conditions, which results in ... property damage neither expected nor
intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. The court stated that in
light of the policy's definition of "accident" as including "continuous or
repeated exposure(s)," an accident could be characterized as a "gradual" event.
See id. Therefore, a construction of "sudden" as quick or instantaneous would
lead to the incongruous interpretation that coverage was provided if the releases
of pollutants were quick or instantaneous and gradual or "continuous or
repeated." See id.; see also Hecla Mining Co. v. New Hampshire Ins. Co.,
811 P.2d 1083, 1092 (Colo. 1991).
54. See Outboard Marine, 607 N.E.2d at 1220-21. The Outboard Marine court
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A significant number of states, however, have held the "sudden
and accidental" exception to be unambiguous and to preclude cov-
erage if the damage-producing pollution release is not quick or
instantaneous. 5 For example, in United States Fidelity and Guaranty
Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc. ,56 the sudden and accidental exception
was held to be unambiguous under Kentucky law by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. 57 The Star Fire court
found that under the pollution exclusion clause, no coverage existed
where the insured, a coal processing company, had discharged ex-
cessive amounts of coal dust over a period of several years, causing
bodily injury and property damage to nearby residents. 58 In holding
reversed a grant of summary judgment for the insurer in which the lower court
held that the insurer had no duty to defend or indemnify insured. See id. at
1221.
55. The term "sudden" has been held unambiguous in the context of the pollution
exclusion clause exception and has been ascribed a temporal meaning by the
highest courts of Florida, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina,
and Ohio. See, e.g., Dimmitt Chevrolet, Inc. v. Southeastern Fidelity Ins.
Corp., 636 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1994); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville
Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990); Upjohn Co. v. New Hampshire Ins.
Co., 476 N.W.2d 392 (Mich. 1991); Board of Regents of the Univ. of Minn.
v. Royal Ins. Co., 517 N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994); Waste Management of the
Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986); Hybud Equip.
Co. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096 (Ohio 1992). See generally
Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146, 151-52
(7th Cir. 1994) (discussing how other courts have treated this issue).
Several United States courts of appeals have held the "sudden and accidental"
exception to the pollution exclusion clause unambiguous under state law. See,
e.g., Cincinnati Ins. Co., 40 F.3d at 152 n.8; Aeroquip Corp. v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 26 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 1994) (construing California law); Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 968 F.2d 707 (8th Cir. 1992)
(construing Missouri law); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 962 F.2d 1484 (10th Cir. 1992) (construing Utah law);
Northern Ins. Co. v. Aardvark Assocs., Inc., 942 F.2d 189 (3d Cir. 1991)
(construing Pennsylvania law); New York v. AMRO Realty Corp., 936 F.2d
1420 (2d Cir. 1991) (construing New York law); A. Johnson & Co. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66 (lst Cir. 1991) (construing Maine law); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 875 F.2d 868 (6th Cir.
1989) aff'g without opinion, 693 F. Supp. 617 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) (construing
Tennessee law); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc.,
856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988) (construing Kentucky law); Great Lakes Container
Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1984) (construing
New Hampshire law); see also United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison
Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437 (D. Kan. 1990) (construing Kansas law), aff'd,
999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993). See generally Cincinnati Ins. Co., 40 F.3d at
151-52 (discussing how other courts have treated this issue). See supra note 44
for a listing of state and federal courts which have held the exclusion exception
to be ambiguous.
56. 856 F.2d 31 (6th Cir. 1988).
57. See id. at 34-35.
58. See id. at 35.
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that courts must give all terms in an insurance contract their plain
meanings when they are not ambiguous, and that the term "sudden"
necessarily contained a temporal element, 59 the Star Fire court rejected
an interpretation of "sudden and accidental" as "unexpected and
unintended.'"60
In Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co. v. Belleville Industries,
Inc.61 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts answered certified
questions from the United States District Court for the District of
Massachusetts 2 concerning Massachusetts's position on whether am-
biguity existed in the "sudden and accidental" exception to the
pollution exclusion clause. 63 The insured in Lumbermens was alleged
to have released oil contaminated with polychlorinated byphenyls
(PCBs) into a nearby river.64 PCB is a substance widely known to
be toxic and commonly used until 1978 to manufacture electric power
transmission equipment. 6 The releases occurred as a result of both
normal plant activities, in which PCB-laden oil accumulated on the
factory floor was washed into storm drains, and two extraordinary
events, a flood and a fire at the factory both of which resulted in
the runoff of water containing PCBs into the storm drains.66
The Lumbermens court needed to determine what meaning would
be ascribed to the word "sudden" in the context of the exception.
67
The court held that the term "sudden" was not ambiguous, and that
the word "sudden" did in fact have a temporal aspect to it.68 The
59. See id. The court stated that this "language is clear and plain, [and is] something
only a lawyer's ingenuity could make ambiguous." Id. at 34; see also Morrison
Grain, 734 F. Supp. at 447 (stating that pollution exclusion "is not merely a
restatement of the definition of occurrence." Rather than merely meaning
"unexpected and unintended," the exclusion clause limits policy coverage "to
accidents distinct in time and place"), aff'd, 999 F.2d 489 (10th Cir. 1993);
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1428
(D. Kan. 1987), aff'd, 946 F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated in part on other
grounds, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th Cir. 1991).
60. See Star Fire, 856 F.2d at 34.
61. 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990).
62. Questions were certified by In re Achusnet River & New Bedford Harbor:
Proceedings Re Alleged PCB Pollution, 725 F. Supp. 1264 (D. Mass. 1989).
Answers to certified questions were followed in Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co.
v. Belleville Indus., Inc., 938 F.2d 1423 (1st Cir. 1991).
63. See Lumbermens, 555 N.E.2d at 572-73.
64. See Lumbermens, 938 F.2d at 1424-26. PCBs were outlawed in 1978 because
of their high toxicity. See id. at 1424. The type of PCBs used at Belleville's
plant, however, was a kind which was over time 99.6% biodegradable into
nontoxic substances, leaving only 0.4% of the material hazardous. See id.
65. See id. at 1424-26.
66. See id. at 1426.
67. See Lumbermens, 555 N.E.2d at 571.
68. See id. at 572-73. The Lumbermens court refused to consider evidence of the
drafting history of the pollution exclusion. See id. Although finding the term
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Lumbermens court consequently concluded that only "[i]f the release
was abrupt and also accidental" would coverage exist for the damage
resulting from the pollution discharge.6 9
5. The "Microanalysis" Approach: A Failed Attempt to
Characterize Long-Term Polluting Activities as "Sudden and
Accidental"
Some insureds have argued that they should be provided coverage
under a "microanalysis" approach to the release of pollutants.
70
Under the microanalysis theory, gradual releases of pollution occur-
ring over a substantial period of time are redefined as a series of
discrete, individual, and abrupt or instantaneous discharges. 7' Under
"sudden" unambiguous in the exclusion clause, the Lumbermens court also
stated in dicta that because there was no evidence that drafting history was
either considered by the policyholder before purchasing the policy or affected
contract negotiations, the drafting history could not be used to resolve ambi-
guity present in the policy. See id. at 573. The court reasoned that since the
drafting history was not the subject of contract negotiations, it could not be
considered as parol evidence in interpreting the contract. See id. Instead, the
Lumbermans court held, the use of drafting history to construe an insurance
policy was similar to the use of statutory drafting history to determining the
meaning of ambiguous legislation. See id. But cf. Morton Int'l Inc. v. General
Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S.
112 (1994). The Morton court discussed the drafting history of the pollution
exclusion, the "sudden and accidental" exception, and the insurance industry's
representation to state insurance commissions that the purpose of the clause
was to eliminate coverage only for releases of pollution which were intended
or expected to result in injury or damage. See id. at 844-73. The Morton court
concluded that in light of the insurance industry's intent expressed to regulators
that to preclude coverage only when the discharge of pollutants was intentional,
the insurance companies had misrepresented their intentions in adopting the
language. See id. at 873-74. Thus, if the insurers intended to restrict coverage
to only situations where the release of pollution was "abrupt and accidental,"
insurance premiums should have been significantly reduced. See id. at 871-73.
The Morton court consequently held that the "sudden and accidental" exception
must be construed to preclude coverage only when the pollution releases were
intentional. See id. at 875.
69. Lumbermens, 555 N.E.2d at 572. The court stated that the "abruptness of the
commencement" of a pollution release was the critical element in determining
whether the discharge was "sudden." See id. If "sudden" was "to have any
meaning or value in the exception to the pollution exclusion clause" it must
pertain to an "abrupt" pollution discharge. Id.
70. See infra notes 168-69.
71. See Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Cent. Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d 793, 797
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that discharges of pollution at landfill which
occurred as result of toxic waste being placed in landfill over period of twenty
years resulting in contamination of groundwater could not "reasonably" be
classified as "sudden"); see also infra notes 168-69. In Sylvester, the policy-
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this characterization, the gradual discharges would fit within the
restricted "temporal" or "unambiguous" construction of the pollu-
tion exception.7 2 This argument generally has been unsuccessful, 73
criticized as illogical and in opposition to the underlying intent of
insurers to exclude from coverage those insureds who deliberately
and intentionally pollute.
7 4
In Anaconda Minerals Co. v. Stoller Chemical Co., 7 the insured
used flue dust from steel mills in the production of fertilizer.76 Flue
dust, contaminated with lead, arsenic and other toxic metals, was
regularly stored outside the plant on the ground where it was dis-
persed by the elements.7 7 The insured also dumped contaminated
metal processing sludge, off-specification flue dust,78 and other toxic
materials in open piles around the factory where they contaminated
the environment. 9
holder, who was the operator of a landfill from which toxic materials had
seeped into the ground and contaminated the groundwater, argued that the
court should analyze each release of contaminants from the landfill as a discrete
and individual discharge rather than looking at the nature of the contamination
as a whole. See id. The court refused to follow this approach on the basis
that "under that theory all releases would be sudden," and that .'[o]ne can
always isolate a specific moment at which pollution actually enters the envi-
ronment."' Id. (quoting Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
754, 768 (6th Cir. 1992)). The Sylvester court stated that under this approach
of classifying each individual release of pollutants from the landfill as "sudden
and accidental" the "exception essentially would swallow the 'rule."' Id.
72. See infra notes 168-69.
73. While state authority on the issue is sparse, several United States district courts
and courts of appeals have rejected this approach. See, e.g., Bureau of
Engraving, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1993)
(construing Minnesota law as rejecting the "discharge-by-discharge" theory on
basis of the Sylvester court's holding); Ray Indus. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
974 F.2d 754, 768 (6th Cir. 1992) (rejecting policyholder's argument that each
release of toxic chemicals from landfill which occurred over a period of several
years was "sudden when viewed in isolation" under theory that every release
would therefore be sudden, and stating that the court was not satisfied that
releases "were brief or momentary"); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Belleville
Indus., 938 F.2d 1423, 1428 (1st Cir. 1991) (rejecting microanalytical approach
because "almost any event can be labelled unexpected, [b]ut [this] approach
would eviscerate the exclusion for pollution"); United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc., 856 F.2d 31, 35 (6th Cir. 1988) (rejecting as
"impossible" insured's characterization of regular discharges of coal dust over
period of several years as 'sudden' within the plain and obvious meaning of
that term"); Sylvester, 503 N.W.2d at 797 (rejecting "microanalysis theory"
as allowing exception to "swallow the rule").
74. See supra notes 71, 73; infra notes 75-81.
75. 773 F. Supp. 1498 (D. Utah 1991), aff'd, 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993).
76. See id. at 1500-01.
77. See id. at 1501.
78. See id. Off-specification flue dust is waste material generated by "aborted
rims" of the manufacturing processes. See id.
79. See id.
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The Anaconda court held that the term "sudden" was synony-
mous with "abruptly" or "quickly" rather than "unexpected," and
concluded that routine discharges of pollutants occurring over a
lengthy period were not "sudden" discharges80 The Anaconda court
further held that intentional and routine discharges were neither
sudden and accidental nor unexpected and unintended. 8'
6. Maryland's Treatment of the Pollution Exclusion in the Lower
Courts: Looking to the "Plain Meaning" of the Policy Terms
In Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Insurance Co.,
8 2
homeowners contracted a termite exterminator to treat their home. 3
They sued the termite exterminator and its insurance company after
the exterminator's agent improperly applied pesticides to the interior
of the dwelling and to exposed exterior portions, rendering the house
uninhabitable.84 The exterminator's insurance clause contained the
pollution exclusion clause, and the homeowners sought a declaratory
judgment that the exclusion clause did not exclude their claim. 85
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the sudden
and accidental exception was not ambiguous, and that the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" were "well defined in the standard
dictionaries.' ' Furthermore, the Bentz court stated that the terms
"sudden" and "accidental" were neither intrinsically unclear nor
unclear in the context of the insurance policy.Y Thus, a reasonable
person reading this language would be able to determine its meaning
on its face without any special knowledge about the insurance con-
tract and would also be able to determine its meaning from the
context of the policy.88 The Bentz court concluded that the negligent
application of pesticides was within the "sudden and accidental"
exception: the discharge was accidental because it was "unintended,"
and was sudden because the chemicals were sprayed directly on the
home, an "instantaneous" contact. 89
80. See id. at 1504. The Anaconda court stated that "[t]o strip 'sudden' of its
temporal element" and construe it as meaning only "'unexpected' ... would
render 'accidental' mere surplusage." Id. at 1505.
81. See id. at 1508.
82. 83 Md. App. 524, 575 A.2d 795 (1990).
83. See id. at 526, 575 A.2d at 796.
84. See id. at 527, 575 A.2d at 796.
85. See id. at 530, 575 A.2d at 798.
86. Id. at 537, 575 A.2d at 801.
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F.
Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987) (stating that the court "declines to contort
the plain language of the policy").
89. See Bentz, 83 Md. App. at 540, 575 A.2d at 803.
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Although the Bentz court concluded that the pollution clause
did not exclude coverage when the harm directly resulted from the
improper use of toxic substances,9 it did not have the opportunity
to determine the effect of the exclusion clause when the pollution
resulted from the insured's inappropriate storage and disposal prac-
tices. The majority of the liability cases arise from contamination
resulting from the insureds' improper methods of storing and dis-
posing of hazardous materials. 91 The liability of an insurer under
Maryland law when contamination occurred in this manner remained
unsettled until the American Motorists decision.9 2
B. Conflict of Laws
1. Introduction to Conflict of Laws
In general, conflict of laws is a distinct subject area of legal
study. It is concerned with principles and policies that courts apply
when taking into consideration elements of law of other jurisdic-
tions. 93 These principles aspire generally to promote fairness and
uniformity between jurisdictions, to define the extent to which the
laws of a state should have effect on another, and to determine
whether the rules of one or another state should be enforced in a
given set of circumstances. 94
90. See id.
91. See, e.g., Jackson Township Mun. Utils. Auth. v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 451 A.2d 990 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1982) (involving negligent site
selection, design, and maintenance of landfill); Lansco v. Department of Envtl.
Protection, 350 A.2d 520 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), aff'd per curiam,
368 A.2d 363 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976) (involving oil spill caused by
vandals); Powers Chemco, Inc. v. Federal Ins. Co., 533 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1988), aff'd, 548 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1989) (involving buried haz-
ardous wastes); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co.,
340 S.E.2d 374 (N.C. 1986) (determining liability of hauler of toxic wastes);
Techalloy Co. v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984)
(involving dumping or storing of chemicals). But cf. Farm Family Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Bagley, 409 N.Y.S.2d 294 (N.Y. App. Div. 1978) (involving liability of
insured who was hired to spray pesticide on a customer's crops, but inadver-
tently contaminated neighboring property). See generally Ballard & Manus,
supra note 29, at 611-12, 634-41.
92. See infra notes 174-80, 184, 276-303 and accompanying text.
93. See EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1.1 (2d ed. 1992).
94. See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 1(1) (1967). The doctrine of recognizing
the laws of foreign jurisdictions or rights created pursuant to foreign laws is
referred to as "comity." 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 3(3) (1967). Recognition
of foreign laws and rights is not binding on the forum which recognizes those
rights; it is a purely voluntary gesture of good will which "carr[ies] with it no
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In practice, conflict-of-laws analysis attempts to ensure that a
case will be considered under the appropriate body of law regardless
of the forum. 9 Courts advance these objectives by means of policies
and procedural rules that serve to reduce or eliminate incentives to
forum shop, promote uniformity and fairness in judgments, and
ensure consistency in the outcome of litigation regardless of jurisdic-
tion.96 While conflict of laws has been the object of levity for some
commentators, 97 many authorities have declared that determining
contractual rights across jurisdictions can give rise to tremendous
confusion and difficulty.98
2. Lex loci contractus
Early American conflict-of-laws theorists focused on the ideas
of "comity of nations" and "vested rights." 99 From these rule-based
implication of relinquishment of sovereignty." Id. As such, the comity which
a court extends to recognize rights created under the laws of other jurisdictions
is a "comity of nations" (or states), not a comity of courts. See id. at 375-
77;.infra note 90. The comity-of-nations principle is also applicable where a
state in the United States gives effect to the laws of a sister state. See 15A
C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 3(7) (1967). The comity-of-states doctrine, as applied
in the conflict of laws, is an inquiry entirely distinct from the Full Faith and
Credit requirement of the United States Constitution, which generally requires
that the states give full effect to judgments, contracts, records, and other
"public acts" of sister states. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. States are not required
to give full effect to statutes and rules of decision of another state if doing so
would interfere with the "local policy" of the forum state. See Klaxon Co. v.
Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941).
95. See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 1(1) (1967).
96. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 578-
79, 659 A.2d 1295, 1304 (1995). The court of appeals stated that lex loci
contractus had traditionally been followed by Maryland courts to achieve
"simplicity, predictability, and uniformity in contract law." Id.; see infra notes
100-02.
97. Conflict of laws has been humorously described in verse as "1[aill about courts
without jurisdiction handing out misery, pain and affliction." THU.mAN AR-
NOLD, FAiR FIoHTs AND FOUL: A DiSSENTING LAWYER's LEM 21-22 (1965). See
infra note 230 for the full text of Arnold's poem and a modern addition
thereto.
98. See 16 AM. JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 74 (1979).
99. See ScoLEs& HAY, supra note 93, §§ 2.4 to .5. The major proponent of the
comity-of-nations doctrine was Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story. See id. §
2.4. The principle of "comity" was an attempt to balance the forum nation's
goal of preserving its sovereignty with the need to give due regard to the laws
of foreign nations to protect their interests. See id. § 13; see also supra note
94. The principle of "vested rights" is that when a right or obligation is
created (or vested) under the law of a nation or state, that right then constitutes
property and other states have an obligation to protect the right or enforce
the obligation unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise. See 15A
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approaches developed the doctrine of lex loci contractus,1' ° or "the
law of the place of making" of a contract, which is followed by a
majority of states, including Maryland. 10 The phrase lex loci con-
tractus, in the general sense, is used to describe a number of different
approaches to the choice of law governing a contract. 0 2 Maryland
CJ.S. Conflict of Laws § 3(4) (1967). Joseph Beale, the leading American
scholar on the vested-rights theory, propounded that a "right having been
created by the appropriate law, the recognition of its existence should follow
everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot be called in question
anywhere." JOSEPH H. BEAn, 3 CASES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 517 (1901),
cited in SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.5.
100. Lex loci contractus literally means "the law of the place of contracting." 15A
C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 11(1) (1967). The term more specifically describes
several methods of determining which jurisdiction's law should be applied. See
id. These methods are "the law of the place of making" (locus celebrationis)
and "the law of the place of performance" (locus solutionis). Id. §§ 11(l)-(3).
Maryland's interpretation of lex loci contractus is discussed in the text accom-
panying infra notes 103, 104. The traditional conflict-of-laws rule underlying
enforcement of contracts is that a contract which is valid in the jurisdiction
where it is created "is considered valid everywhere, and will be enforced
everywhere," unless enforcement would violate statutory law or the "settled
public policy" of the forum, or otherwise "work injury" to citizens of the
forum jurisdiction. See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 4(10) (1967). This
approach follows Beale's vested-rights theory and is the basis for lex loci
contractus. See supra note 99.
101. American Motorists, 338 Md. at 581, 659 A.2d at 1305; see also SCOLES &
HAY, supra note 93, § 18.21. Several states still follow the more rigid and
mechanical principles of the Restatement (First) of Conflict of Laws, such as
lex loci contractus. See ScOLEs & HAY, supra note 93, § 18.21. The states that
still follow this approach include: Alabama, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia,
Iowa, Maryland, Michigan, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Wyoming. See, e.g., Fried v. North
River Ins. Co., 710 F.2d 1022 (4th Cir. 1983) (construing North Carolina law);
Wells v. 10-X Mfg. Co., 609 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1979) (construing Michigan
law); Mullinax Eng'g Co. v. Platte Valley Constr. Co., 412 F.2d 553 (10th
Cir. 1969) (construing Wyoming law); Morgan v. Mar-Bel, Inc., 614 F. Supp.
438, 441 (N.D. Ga. 1985) (dictum); Starkenstein v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 189 (M.D. Fla. 1983); Harrison v. Insurance
Co. of N. Am., 318 So. 2d 253 (Ala. 1975); King Int'l Corp. v. Voloshin, 366
A.2d 1172 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1976); Joseph L. Wilmotte & Co. v. Rosenman
Bros., 258 N.W.2d 317 (Iowa 1977) (limiting use of most significant relationship
test to arbitration provision); Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 332 A.2d 651
(1975); Sandoval v. Valdez, 580 P.2d 131 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978); Nordenstrom
v. Swedberg, 143 N.W.2d 848 (N.D. 1966); Telex Corp. v. Hamilton, 576 P.2d
767 (Okla. 1978); Union Savings Bank v. DeMarco, 254 A.2d 81 (R.I. 1969);
Witter v. Torbett, 604 F. Supp. 298 (W.D. Va. 1984); see also ScoLEs & HAY,
supra note 93, § 18.21 n.2. But see infra note 111 (noting that some states'
decisions are compatible with both lex loci contractus and the Second Restate-
ment).
102. See generally American Motorists, 338 Md. at 570, 659 A.2d at 1300 (1995)
(describing a number of different appeals to choice of contract law); Kramer
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courts follow the rule that applies the substantive law of the juris-
diction where the step making the contract valid and binding occurs. 103
The stated reasons for Maryland's preference for the lex loci con-
tractus approach to contractual conflict-of-laws issues are simplicity,
uniformity, and predictability1 °4
Although simplicity and uniformity have traditionally been the
major factors cited for Maryland's adherence to lex loci contractus,
the application of the doctrine has several drawbacks, some of which
have been exacerbated by the advent of modern technology and the
rise of electronic commerce. 05 The application of lex loci contractus
to a suit on a contract completed in a different jurisdiction from
that where the majority of the negotiations occurred, or a jurisdiction
different from that in which performance will occur, may lead to an
arbitrary and unreasonable application of law. 1°6 These problems,
v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 390, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988); supra
note 100. Prior to American Motorists, Maryland had already recognized two
exceptions to lex loci contractus: the public policy exception, and Maryland's
adoption of Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971), which allows contracting parties to specify which jurisdiction's law
would govern any disputes arising from the contract. See National Glass, Inc.
v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc., 336 Md. 606, 610-12, 650 A.2d 246, 248-49
(1994); see also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183,
498 A.2d 605 (1985) (citing public policy exception); Kronovet v. Lipchin, 288
Md. 30, 43-46, 415 A.2d 1096, 1104-06 (1980) (citing Maryland's acceptance
of Section 187 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws which allows
contracting parties to choose which law will govern the contract); Kramer, 311
Md. at 395-96, 535 A.2d at 469-70 (holding that enforcement of gambling debt
made in New Jersey casino was not against Maryland public policy because,
although casino gambling is illegal in Maryland, other types of gambling were
permitted under Maryland law); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON-
FUCT OF LAWS § 187 (1971).
103. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1253 (D.
Md. 1989). This case is discussed for its renvoi holding infra notes 153-72. See
also Kramer, 311 Md. at 390, 535 A.2d at 467.
104. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1304.
105. See id. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1304-05. The growth of electronic commerce and
contemporary business practices have eroded the certainty of the place of
contracting, and reduced its significance to the negotiations and consummation
of a contract. See id. Interstate commerce utilizing telephonic and facsimile
transmission may make it difficult to determine "where" a contract was formed.
See, e.g., Johnson Matthey, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Mfrs. Ass'n Ins. Co., 593
A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991) (noting that where negotiations
and approval of a contractual purchase involve contacts located in numerous
states the place of contracting may be difficult to discern as well as irrelevant);
see also Cochran v. Ellsworth, 272 P.2d 904, 908 (Cal. Ct. App. 1954) (stating
that lex loci contractus has been criticized for "frequently elevat[ing] fortuitous
and insignificant circumstances to crucial importance in establishing the con-
trolling law").
106. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305.
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In general, modern approaches to conflict-of-laws problems,
including the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws (1971) (Second
Restatement), stress ascertaining the interests of involved jurisdic-
tions.108 One group of early modern conflict-of-law theorists focused
on determining which jurisdiction had the greatest "governmental
interests" in the litigation.109 Other scholars set about attempting to
devise modern rules of solving legal conflicts which would allow
courts to determine, in a predictable and consistent manner, the
jurisdiction with the greatest interest in the litigation." 0
107. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.6.
108. See id.; see also infra notes 109-12.
109. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.6. The modern approaches concentrated
on examination of "legal relationships" rather than application of mechanical
rules of law. See id. Professor Brainerd Currie was one of the first legal
scholars to advocate this approach. See id. Currie's "interest analysis," which
gained support during the 1960s, started with the principle that every state had
an interest in its courts applying the state's own laws. See id. Under Currie's
approach, the forum first determines whether a "conflict" actually exists. See
James A. McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of
Law: Justice in Search of Certainty, Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 73, 77-78
(1991). A "false conflict" exists if it is determined that the applicable laws of
the involved states either point to the same conclusion, or it is discovered that
one state's law is not applicable to the situation. See SCORES & HAY, supra
note 93, § 2.6. A "true conflict" occurs if both state's laws are not only
different, but each one is also applicable. See id. In the case of a true conflict,
the court is to consider whether a "restrained interpretation" of the law of
one of the concerned jurisdictions would avoid the conflict. See id. If the
conflict is "unavoidable," however, Currie advocates that the law of the forum
should apply. See id. Currie's "forum-biased" approach has been severely
criticized for promoting forum shopping as well as a failure to achieve fairness
in results, predictability, and consistency. See id.; McLaughlin, supra, at 77-
82.
110. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.9. The leading scholar of the "value-
oriented" approach was Robert Leflar, who proposed five "choice-influencing"
considerations which in theory both reflected the elements that guide, or ought
to guide, a court's choice of law. See id. § 2.9. The five elements were: "(1)
predictability of results, (2) maintenance of interstate and international order,
(3) simplification of the judicial task, (4) advancement of the forum's govern-
mental interest, and (5) the application of the better rule of law." Id.; see also
McLaughlin, supra note 109, at 83-86. The fifth factor has spawned the greatest
controversy. See McLaughlin, supra note 109, at 83-86. Although the "better
rule of law" approach has been adopted by various jurisdictions, it has been
criticized for being a truism and merely setting to paper the procedures already
widely used in practice. See id. In addition, in practice the "better law ...
almost invariably . . . [is] found to be that of the forum." SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 93, § 2.11.
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The Second Restatement, released in 1971, attempted to combine
the theories proposed during its drafting in the 1950s and 1960s.1'
The Restatement focuses on determining the jurisdiction with the
"most significant relationship" to the litigation. 2 Specifically, in
111. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.13. The jurisdictions which now follow,
or are in a transition to follow, the Second Restatement are: Arizona, Colorado,
Ddaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, and Washington. See,
e.g., Dr. Franklin Perkins Sch. v. Freeman, 741 F.2d 1503 (7th Cir. 1984)
(construing Illinois law); FMC Fin. Corp. v. Reed, 592 F.2d 283, 241 (5th Cir.
1979) (construing Mississippi law); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr.
Corp., 558 F.2d 948 (9th Cir. 1977) (construing Hawaii law); In re Parkwood,
Inc., 461 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Power Motive Corp. v. Mannesmann
Demag Corp., 617 F. Supp. 1048 (D. Colo. 1985); Rhode Island Hosp. Trust
Nat'l Bank v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 613 F. Supp. 1197 (D.R.I. 1985), rev'd on
other grounds, 789 F.2d 74 (1st Cir. 1986); Lincoln Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v.
NCR Corp., 603 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D. Ind. 1984), aff'd, 772 F.2d 315 (7th
Cir. 1985); F.E. Meyers Co. v. Pipe Maintenance Services, Inc., 599 F. Supp.
697 (D. Del. 1984); Fojo v. American Express Co., 554 F. Supp. 1199 (D.P.R.
1983); Bernstein v. Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co., 449 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Mo.
1978); Taylor v. Security Nat'l Bank, 514 P.2d 257 (Ariz. 1973); Unigard Ins.
Group v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 633 (Idaho 1979); Lewis v. American
Family Ins. Group, 555 S.W.2d 579 (Ky. 1977); Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v.
Raytheon, Co., 473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985); New England Merchants Nat'l
Bank v. Lost Valley Corp., 400 A.2d 1178 (N.H. 1979); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488 (N.J. 1980); Auten v.
Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d
414 (Tex. 1984); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 245 A.2d 891 (Vt. 1968);
Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P.2d 623 (Wash. 1967).
Some states' decisions, however, are compatible with both the lex loci
contractus principle and the "center-of-gravity" test of section 188 of the
Second Restatement. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 18.21 nn.2-3. These
states are Arkansas, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Tennessee. See, e.g., Ladd v.
Ladd, 580 S.W.2d 696 (Ark. 1979); Bushkin Assocs., Inc. v. Raytheon, Co.,
473 N.E.2d 662 (Mass. 1985); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ferrin, 487 N.E.2d
568 (Ohio 1986) (holding Ohio adhered to law of place of contract formation
to determine interpretation, but also citing factors from section 188 of Second
Restatement); Central States Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund v.
Kraftco., Inc. 589 F. Supp. 1061 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), rev'd on other grounds,
799 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1986). See also supra note 101 for a listing of states
which have not adopted the Second Restatement.
112. See ScoLus & AY, supra note 93, § 2.13. The Second Restatement has been
characterized as "schizophrenic" because it employs presumptive rules remi-
niscent of both the lex loci contractus approach as well as an analytical interests
analysis to determine the jurisdiction with the "most significant relationship"
to the litigation. See McLaughlin, supra note 100, at 77. The interests analysis
consists of the following factors: "(1) the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems, (2) the relevant policies of other interested states including their
interests in having their law applied to the particular issue, (3) the protection
of party expectations, (4) the basic policies underlying the particular field of
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section 188111 the place of making the contract, as well as the places
of negotiation and performance, become factors to be considered in
determining which state has the most significant relationship." 4 Sec-
tion 193 of the Second Restatement states that, in the case of
insurance contracts, the law of the state where the "parties under-
stand" the principal risk to be located will be applied to the contract
unless some other state's law is determined to have a "more signif-
icant relationship." 11
law, (5) the objectives of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result,
and (6) the ease of determining and applying the law previously identified as
applicable." SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.13. The presumptive rules serve
as the context within which the analytical factors will be evaluated. See id. §
2.13. For example, when determining the law governing a contract (in the
absence of an effective choice by the parties, section 188), the court is to
consider, in applying the six analytic principles listed above, the following five
contacts, and thereby determine which jurisdiction has the most significant
relationship to the contract: (1) the place of contracting, (2) the place of
negotiations, (3) the place of performance, (4) the location of the subject
matter, and (5) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation,
and place of business of the parties. See SCOLEs & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.14
n.l (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)). The
substantive law of the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts will be
applied to the contract. See id. The Second Restatement has drawn criticism
because of its substitution of analysis for set rules, the subjectivity involved in
determining the jurisdiction with the most significant relationships, and also
because of the danger that courts might apply it in a forum-biased manner.
See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 93, § 2.15. Despite the criticism, however,
acceptance of the Second Restatement appears to be growing. See McLaughlin,
supra note 109, at 77. For a list of states that have adopted or are in the
process of adopting the Second Restatement's contract principles see supra
note 111. Maryland continues to abide by lex loci contractus and has not
adopted the contract law principles of the Second Restatement. See supra note
101.
113. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971) (applying to
contracts that do not expressly state a forum); see also supra note 112.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2a-c) (1971). Subsection
3 states that if negotiation and performance of the contract occur in the same
state, that state's law will generally apply. See id. § 188(3).
115. Id § 193. Section 193 pertains to "Fire, Surety or Casualty" insurance contracts
and includes contracts for liability insurance. See id. The law of the state
where the insured risk is principally located may not control the insurance
contract if the insured risk is a chattel which has no principal location and is
moved continuously from state to state. See id. § 193 cmt. b. If the insurance
contract is invalid under the law of the state of the risk's principal location,
but is valid under the law of another state with a substantial relationship to
the risk, that other state's law may control the contract. See id. § 193, cmt.
d. If the risk's principal location is transferred from one state to another, the
state law of the new location may control. See id. Choice-of-law provisions in
insurance contracts which specify the law of a state other than the state in
which the insured risk is located often will not be recognized if the specified
state's law affords the insured less protection than the law of the state in which
the insured risk is principally located. See id. § 193 cmt. e.
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4. Exceptions to Conflicts Doctrines
Regardless of which conflict-of-laws doctrine is followed, the
court of the forum state may wish to apply the law of a jurisdiction
different than that which the forum's conflicts doctrine directs it to
apply."1 Three major exceptions to conflicts doctrines allow the
forum state to do this. First, the public policy exception allows the
forum state to apply its own law when the law of the foreign
jurisdiction is contrary to the forum state's settled public policy."
7
Second, the forum may apply renvoi, a conflicts principle which
directs the forum to look at the conflicts rules, as well as the
substantive law, of the foreign state."' If the foreign state, under its
own conflicts doctrine, would apply the law of the forum or a third
state, then the forum court would as well. 19 The doctrine, in effect,
puts the forum court in the place of the foreign court.'2 Third,
courts that follow the Second Restatement may apply another state's
conflicts doctrine in certain circumstances, such as when the forum's
relationship to the subject of the dispute is limited, and thereby
determine whether the forum's own substantive law, or that of a
different state, should be applied to the litigation. 121
a. The Public Policy Exception: Rejecting Another State's Law
The public policy exception is employed if the forum state decides
that the law of the state it is directed to apply is contrary to the
forum's settled public policy.'2 The public policy exception will not
be invoked for mere differences between the laws of the forum and
non-forum state. The public policy exception is triggered following
examination of "pertinent Maryland law" 123 and a determination that
the foreign law is an abrogation of the relevant local law or public
policy.124 Illustrative of this process is Kramer v. Bally's Park Place,
116. Generally, a court will avoid application of the referenced state's law if
application of that law will produce a result inconsistent with the objectives
of conflict of laws, such as an unfair outcome or a result different than that
which would have occurred had the case been decided in another jurisdiction.
See supra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
117. See infra notes 107, 122-38 and accompanying text.
118. See infra notes 139-63 and accompanying text.
119. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
120. See infra notes 141-52 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
122. See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws §4(4) (1967); supra note 102.
123. See Kramer v. Bally's Park Place, Inc., 331 Md. 387, 393, 535 A.2d 466, 468
(1988).
124. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 187-90,
498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985) (holding that Pennsylvania common law permitting
clauses in construction contracts providing for indemnity against results of
on's own negligence was abrogated by Maryland statutory law specifically
providing that such clauses are void and unenforceable as against public policy).
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Inc. 25 which permitted the enforcement of a gambling debt' 2 incurred
by a Maryland resident in a New Jersey casino that had been reduced
to judgment in New Jersey under New Jersey law. 27 Examining
Maryland law, the court of appeals found Maryland statutory pro-
visions permitting the enforcement of gambling debts ' 21 and several
forms of legalized gambling. 129 Thus, the court determined that
Maryland did not have a strong public policy against gambling,
despite the fact that casino gambling was unlawful in Maryland. 130
The court, therefore, declined to apply the public policy exception
and following lex loci contractus permitted enforcement of the debt
under New Jersey law. 3'
The public policy exception to lex loci contractus is necessarily
narrow.3 2 If Maryland consistently declined to follow its stated
conflict-of-laws rules to the prejudice of other states in cases where
Maryland law was merely "different" than, as opposed to in conflict
with, other states' laws, those states might refuse to apply Maryland
law to cases involving litigation of significant interest to Maryland.'
If strong public policy exists, however, a court will generally
apply Maryland law rather than another state's law. 134 In National
Glass, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Properties, Inc.,1 35 Maryland's high court
declined to follow lex loci contractus and applied Maryland substan-
tive law, rather than Pennsylvania law, to a dispute between a
property owner and a glass supplier who brought a materialman's
lien against the property owner. 13 6 The subcontract was executed in
Pennsylvania and contained a provision by which the glass supplier
waived its right to bring such a lien.' 37 This provision was valid in
Pennsylvania, but Maryland statutory law proscribed such a waiver
as being void and against Maryland's stated public policy.13
125. 311 Md. 387, 535 A.2d 466 (1988); see supra note 102.
126. See Kramer, 311 Md. at 398, 535 A.2d at 468-71.
127. See id. at 388-89, 535 A.2d at 366-67.
128. See id. at 393-95, 535 A.2d at 469-70.
129. See id. at 395-96, 535 A.2d at 470.
130. See id. at 391-96, 535 A.2d at 468-70.
131. See id. at 398, 535 A.2d at 471.
132. See ScoLs & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.15.
133. See Kramer, 311 Md. at 391-96, 535 A.2d at 468-70.
134. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 187-90,
498 A.2d 605, 608 (1985) (holding that Pennsylvania common law permitting
clauses in construction contracts providing for indemnity against results of
one's own negligence was abrogated by Maryland statutory law specifically
providing that such clauses are void and unenforceable as against public policy).
135. 336 Md. 606, 650 A.2d 246 (1994).
136. See id. at 614-15, 650 A.2d at 250.
137. See id. at 609, 650 A.2d at 247.
138. See id. at 613-14, 650 A.2d at 250.
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b. Renvoi: A Logical Means of Escape from Repugnant Law?
The doctrine of renvo'39 has not enjoyed unqualified support in
American jurisprudence. 140 The basis of the renvoi doctrine is that
when a forum court is referred to the law of another state through
the application of the forum's own conflict of laws principles, the
forum court will look not only at the substantive law of that state,
but to that state's choice-of-law principles. 41 The forum court will,
in effect, place itself in the position of a court of that jurisdiction
and determine whose law should apply under the referenced jurisd-
iction's choice of law principles. 42 For example, if a Maryland court
applies the renvoi doctrine to a dispute involving a contract executed
in New York for the construction of a building in Maryland, the
Maryland court will first look to the law of New York, which is the
state of contract formation. 43 The court would next apply New
York's choice-of-law principle - "the most significant relationships"
test espoused by Section 188 of the Second Restatement.'" If the
Maryland court then determines that, although the contract was
executed in New York, Maryland has the most significant relationship
139. Renvoi translates from French as "to send back." See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of
Laws § 7 (1967). The principle of renvoi is that when a forum resorts to the
use of foreign law to decide a case the forum will apply the foreign state's
conflict-of-laws rule as well as its substantive law. See id. Renvoi was criticized
and rejected by early commentators for leading to circular reasoning and for
wrongfully allowing the procedural rules of foreign jurisdictions to control the
forum court. See id.; see also Ernest 0. Schreiber, Jr., Doctrine of Renvoi in
Anglo-American Law, 31 HARV. L. REv. 523 (1918) (calling for rejection of
renvo); Ernst G. Lorenzen, The Renvoi Theory and the Application of Foreign
Law, 10 COLuM. L. Rv. 327, 344 (1910) (stating that renvoi is "no part of
the Conflict of Laws of the United States").
140. Early commentators were critical of renvoi due to its penchant for circular
reasoning, to which there appeared no equitable solution. See Schreiber, supra
note 139, at 528, 533. Renvoi was also objected to on the grounds that the
subrogation of the forum's own conflict-of-laws rule to those of a foreign
jurisdiction constituted an affront to the sovereignty of the forum court and
state. See id. at 534; see also Lorenzen, supra note 139, at 344 (stating that
renvoi was no part of American law). Lorenzen claimed that renvoi was a
manipulative theory that courts used to circumvent the just application of
foreign law. See Lorenzen, supra note 139; see also 15A C.J.S. Conflict of
Laws § 7 (1967).
141. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13; see also supra note 139.
142. See Rhoda S. Barish, Comment, Renvoi and the Modern Approaches to Choice-
of-Law, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 1049, 1061-63 (1981).
143. See supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text (noting that Maryland follows
lex loci contractus).
144. See supra notes 99, 108-15 and accompanying text (noting that New York
follows Second Restatement in conflicts-of-laws issues).
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to the dispute, the court will be directed to apply Maryland law. 145
If a Maryland court, however, decides a suit over a contract
executed in New York for construction of a building in Delaware,
the court may determine that under New York's conflict-of-laws
principles, Delaware has the most significant relationships to the
dispute. 1' The court will then utilize Delaware's conflict-of-laws
principles and apply them to the facts of the case. 147 If examination
of Delaware's conflict-of-laws principles leads the court to the con-
clusion that Delaware's substantive law should be applied to the case,
the court will then decide the case using Delaware substantive law.'4
This is known as a "transmission."' 149
Renvoi's major flaw is readily apparent under the first example,
where the court is referred back to Maryland law. Upon remission
from New York's choice-of-law principles, the court would be obliged
under renvoi to look again at Maryland "whole law," including its
choice-of-law principles.5 0 Since the contract was executed in New
York, Maryland's contractual choice-of-law principle, lex loci con-
tractus, will again refer the court to the whole law of New York,
which will refer the court again to Maryland, and so forth, in an
endless cycle of searching for the appropriate body of substantive
law to apply."'5 Renvoi has been rejected by many jurisdictions as a
result of this defect in its logic.
5 2
Despite the drawbacks of the renvoi doctrine, its use has received
support as a method to foster consistency and uniformity in the
outcome of litigation and as a deterrent to forum shopping.'53 It is
145. See Barish, supra note 142, at 1062. If the forum is referred back to its own
substantive law by the conflict-of-laws principles of the referenced state the
procedure is known as a "remission." See id.
146. See id. at 1063. The process of "transmission" occurs when the referenced
state's conflict-of-laws principles refer the court to the laws of a third state.
See id. at 1064.
147. See id.
148. See supra note Il1 (noting that Delaware follows approach of the Second
Restatement).
149. See supra note 146. If a renvoi transmission or remission is only to the
substantive law of the forum or another state, a "partial renvoi" occurs. See
Barish, supra note 142, at 1063. If the renvoi transmission or remission is to
the "whole law" of the other state - that state's conflicts rules as well as its
substantive law - a "total renvoi" occurs. See id. Under a total renvoi, the
forum adjudicates the dispute as if it were the court of the state to which the
forum court was referred by its own choice of laws rule. See id.
150. See Schreiber, supra note 139, at 528, 533; see also supra note 149 (defining
concept of "whole law"). See also supra note 140 for a description of criticisms
of the logic of renvoi.
151. See Schreiber, supra note 139, at 528, 533.
152. See 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 7 (1967 & Supp. 1985).
153. See Barish, supra note 142, at 1065. Renvoi has been viewed more favorably
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suggested that courts utilize renvoi principles in order to protect the
interests of jurisdictions involved in a conflict of laws dispute and
to identify the presence or absence of actual conflicts. 5 4 By analyzing
the objectives underlying the substantive law and conflict-of-laws
principles of the jurisdictions involved, the forum may be able to
achieve a consistent and equitable decision while avoiding the endless
cycles of searching inherent in the traditional, mechanical operation
of renvoi.'5 The forum may also break the endless cycle by simply
accepting a renvoi reference back and applying its own substantive
law to the case. 5 6 In some cases there may not even be an actual
''conflict.' 5 7 The forum may find that in looking at the whole body
of law of the foreign jurisdiction, that state's choice-of-law principles
instruct the court to apply that jurisdiction's internal law, so that
the jurisdictions involved agree on which substantive law should
govern the dispute. 5 The application of renvoi may also allow the
forum to avoid applying a disfavored legal principle of the foreign
jurisdiction without the undesirable side effect of potentially antag-
recently as an "escape device" allowing a court to avoid the application of
repugnant foreign law while exhibiting consideration for the laws of a foreign
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F.
Supp. 1252, 1254-55 (D. Md. 1989) (predicting that Maryland would adopt
renvoi and apply Maryland law to declaratory judgment action concerning
insurer's liability for costs related to cleanup of pollution occurring in Maryland
under insurance policies issued in New Jersey and New York, because those
courts would apply Maryland law as the state with the most significant
relationship to the litigation); Barish, supra note 142, at 1066-67; see also
Nolan v. Berger, 203 N.E.2d 274, 278 (Ohio P. Ct. 1963) (noting that litigation
of claims involving title to real estate is one of few instances where use of
renvoi is considered appropriate, and the forum therefore applies the whole
law of the referenced state as if it were the court of that state, and thereby
applies substantive law of the forum); cf. Davis v. P.R. Sales Co., 304 F.2d
831, 833-34 (2d Cir. 1962) (approving of renvoi in the case of conditional
contract of sale, but holding that its use would not affect substantive law
applied to the case). But see Eastern Stainless Corp. v. American Protection
Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (D. Md. 1993) (predicting Maryland would
apply renvoi only in "exceptional situations" such as when "important public
policy" is at issue). See generally SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13 n.8
and accompanying text.
154. See Barish, supra note 142, at 1067-68; ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13.
155. See Barish, supra note 142, at 1066-68.
156. See ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13.
157. See id.
158. See id.; see also Barish, supra note 142, at 1066. False conflicts have been
interpreted as occurring when: (1) the laws of the involved jurisdictions are in
agreement or the outcome of the litigation would not differ depending upon
which state adjudicated the claim; or (2) one jurisdiction discloses a legitimate
interest in having its law applied to the claim while the other jurisdiction holds
no such interest. See 16 Am. JutR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 85 (1979). Courts
are split over which of the above described interpretations is correct. See id.
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onizing the other involved jurisdiction by openly declaring a public-
policy exception. 5 9
Despite the general lack of enthusiasm for renvoi among this
country's judiciary, the United States District Court for the District
of Maryland applied renvoi in Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Allied-
Signal, Inc. '60 In this case, the insurer sought a declaratory judgment
that it had no duty to pay the costs of remedying pollution at the
insured's manufacturing facilities.' 6' The insurance policies at issue
were delivered to the insured's headquarters in New York, and later
New Jersey. 162 The contaminated facilities were located in Mary-
land. 63 The insurer argued that Maryland substantive law, which
precluded coverage for environmental clean-up costs, was applicable,
while the insured argued that New York and New Jersey substantive
law applied. "64
In holding that Maryland substantive law was applicable, the
Travelers court noted that a Maryland court would apply lex loci
contractus to this case to determine whether New York or New Jersey
law was applicable. 165 The court also stated, however, that if suit
was brought in New York or New Jersey, "the irony would be
supreme" because those states would apply the substantive law of
Maryland as the state with the most substantial relationships to the
proceedings. 166Thus, the Travelers court concluded renvoi should be
employed to avoid this false conflict.
67
The Travelers court speculated that the Court of Appeals of
Maryland would use renvoi to avoid applying disfavored foreign law
when the state whose substantive law was chosen through lex loci
contractus would itself choose Maryland substantive law. 68 Prior to
159. See Barish, supra note 142, at 1067-68. Some courts have rejected renvoi, but
stated that application of the doctrine would not have affected the substantive
law of the case. See, e.g., Hawley v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 625 F.2d 991, 994
(10th Cir. 1980); Rutherford v. Gray Line, Inc., 615 F.2d 944, 947 (2d Cir.
1980); Patch v. Stanley Works (Stanley Chemical Co.), 448 F.2d 483, 491-92
(2d Cir. 1971).
160. 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1989).
161. See id. at 1252.
162. See id.
163. See id. at 1253.
164. See id.
165. See id. at 1253-54. The Travelers court tacitly found that renvoi and the public
policy exception to lex loci contractus were identical. See id. (stating that when
considering "issues of important public policy," Maryland decisional law
permitting forum to determine if state referenced by lex loci contractus would
refer to Maryland substantive law constitutes use of renvoi to remedy false
conflict); see also supra note 109 (explaining false conflicts).
166. Travelers, 718 F. Supp. at 1254 n.3.
167. See id. at 1254; see also supra note 165.
168. See Travelers, 718 F. Supp. at 1253-54; see also supra notes 109, 153.
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the American Motorists decision, Maryland relied upon the. public-
policy exception to lex loci contractus where the law of another state
was considered repugnant. 6 9 As a result, uncertainty existed as to
the status of renvoi in Maryland. 170 The Travelers court stated that
the Court of Appeals of Maryland ought to consider the extent of
Maryland's public policy on the duty of insurers' coverage of pol-
lution clean-up costs, 17 1 and suggested that Maryland contemplate the
adoption of renvoi to avoid overuse of the public-policy exception.
72
c. The Approach of the Second Restatement
The Second Restatement advocates the use of renvoi, that is the
forum's application of another state's conflict-of-laws principles in
two situations: (1) when the objective of the forum's conflict-of-laws
principle at issue is that the outcome of the litigation be the same
as if the suit had been brought in another jurisdiction; and (2) when
the forum state has no significant relationship to the subject of the
litigation, and the courts of all involved states are in. agreement as
to which state's substantive law should apply to the case. 73 Although
169. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. G.C. Zarnas & Co., 304 Md. 183, 188-91, 498
A2d 605, 607-08 (1985).
170. Despite the Travelers court suggestions, the Court of Appeals of Maryland did
not speak to the role of renvoi in Maryland law until it decided American
Motorists Insurance Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc. See generally American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 569, 659 A.2d 1295,
1299 (1995) (stating that the court was adopting for the first time "a limited
form of renvoi").
171. See Travelers, 718 F. Supp. at 1255.
172. See id. Generally, public policy is furthered by support of, rather than exception
to, lex loci contractus because of the predictability of the rule. See id. For the
forum not to apply its substantive law as a matter of public policy to matters
which "directly affect" its human and natural resources would appear as an
"unseemly derogation" of the forum's sovereign power. Id.; see also supra
note 153 (discussing use of renvoi as a means for the forum to uphold its
public policy while showing deference to the laws of another jurisdiction).
173. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8 (1971); SCOLES & HAY,
supra note 93, § 3.13. When the objective of the forum's choice-of-law
principles is uniformity of result, the court will apply another state's choice-
of-law principles "subject to considerations of practicability and feasibility."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 8(2) (1971). If the forum
determines that the choice-of-law rules of another state are unclear, and that
the forum consequently cannot achieve a result consistent with the objective
of that state's conflict-of-laws rules, it will decline to apply that state's conflicts
rule. See id. § 8(2) cmt. j. Similarly, if the forum believes it cannot determine
with any level of certainty how the courts of another state would decide a
conflict-of-laws issue, the forum will decline to apply that state's conflict of
laws. See id. Section 8(3) states that when the forum has no "substantial
relationship" to the litigation and all interested jurisdictions would agree on
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the Second Restatement's use of renvoi may promote uniformity of
outcome, a primary objective of any conflict-of-laws doctrine, Amer-
ican courts have generally been reluctant to adopt any application
of the renvoi doctrine.1 74 The Court of Appeals of Maryland ad-
which substantive law would apply (false conflict), the forum should apply this
local law. See id. § 8(3); see also Forsyth v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 520 F.2d
608, 611-12 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding that where there was no true conflict
between the laws of states with interests in tort action or with laws of neutral
forum in which suit was brought, forum may apply its own substantive law);
cf Tramontana v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense, 350 F.2d
468 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that Brazilian law applied to claim of Maryland
resident brought in federal court in the District of Columbia for wrongful
death occurring in Brazilian air crash due to alleged negligence of Brazilian
airline, because Maryland statutory and case law disclosed disinterest in appli-
cation of Maryland law to case and interest of District of Columbia in having
its substantive law applied to litigation was even less significant than that of
Maryland); United States v. Neal, 443 F. Supp. 1307, 1313-15 (D. Neb. 1978)
(holding that where federal tort claim arose in state following Second Restate-
ment and was valid under that state's law but invalid under internal law of
state with most significant relationships, applying law of state where claim
arose was proper under conflicts rules of both states). But see Pfau v. Trent
Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 137 (N.J. 1970) (holding that the application
of another state's choice-of-law rule "would frustrate the very goals of gov-
ernmental-interest analysis"); Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d
814, 820 (Wis. 1959) (expressly rejecting renvoi because of circularity).
174. See ScoLss & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.14. The use of renvoi has been rejected
by courts in the following states: Delaware, Illinois, Indiana, New Hampshire,
New Jersey, New York, and Wisconsin. See, e.g., Folk v. York-Shipley, 239
A.2d 236, 239-40 (Del. 1968) (rejecting renvoi on grounds that it contradicted
Delaware's adherence to applying only substantive law of place of wrong and
that "general rule" of choice of law is that forum only applies substantive law
of another state); Aurora Nat'l Bank v. Anderson, 268 N.E.2d 552, 555 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1971) (citing Haumschild v. Continental Cas. Co., 95 N.W.2d 814
(Wis. 1959) as persuasive authority for rejection of renvoi); Maroon v. State,
411 N.E.2d 404, 413 (Ind. App. 1980) (rejecting renvoi as an "ancient,
disfavored doctrine"); Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 209 (N.H. 1966) (rejecting
renvoi as a "manipulative technique" used to justify choice of law); Breslin
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 341 A.2d 342, 347 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975)
(rejecting renvoi despite its endorsement under section 8 of the Second Restate-
ment, on grounds of its "circular process"), aff'd, 354 A.2d 635 (N.J. 1976);
Lewandowski v. National Grange Mut. Ins. Co., 374 A.2d 489, 494 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) (rejecting renvoi in favor of applying only substantive
law of referenced state); In re Damato's Estate, 206 A.2d 171, 175-76 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (rejecting renvoi on grounds of circuity and
inconsistency with common-law choice-of-laws principles); Rescildo v. R.H.
Macy's, 594 N.Y.S.2d 139, 140, 142 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) (rejecting renvoi
because of circuity and because it encourages forum shopping); Wyatt v.
Fulrath, 239 N.Y.S.2d 486, 493 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1963) (rejecting renvoi as
neither followed in New York nor accepted generally by American courts),
aff'd as modified, 211 N.E.2d 637 (N.Y. 1965); Conklin v. Homer, 157 N.W.2d
579, 587 (Wis. 1968) (rejecting renvoi as incorrectly displacing forum's choice-
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dressed this controversial legal theory for the first time in American
Motorists Insurance Co. v. AR TRA Group, Inc.'
III. THE INSTANT CASE
A. Factual Background
The contamination at issue in American Motorists occurred at
a paint manufacturing facility located on Hollins Ferry Road in
southwestern Baltimore City (Site). 76 The Site was constructed in the
mid-1940s and began operations in 1946 under the control of one of
ARTRA's predecessor companies.'7 ARTRA and its predecessors
used the Site for production and distribution of paints and similar
chemical products. 
78
of-law principles); see also Milkovitch v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408, 415 (Minn.
1973) (reiterating that renvoi has been criticized as "manipulative technique").
Renvoi has also been recently rejected by several federal courts. See, e.g.,
Amoco Rocmount Co. v. Anschutz Corp., 7 F.3d 909, 920 (10th Cir. 1993)
(rejecting renvoi as inappropriate for application in circumstances other than
those described in sections 8(2) & (3) of the Second Restatement), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 112 (1994); In re the Oil Spill by the Amoco Cadiz Off the Coast of
France on March 16, 1978, 954 F.2d 1279, 1336 (7th Cir. 1992) (describing
renvoi as "spectre" resulting in an "infinite loop"); Eastern Stainless Corp.
v. American Protection Ins. Co., 829 F. Supp. 797, 800 (D. Md. 1993) (declining
to apply renvoi to insured's claim of bad-faith failure of insurer to pay insurance
claim and stating that Maryland applies renvoi only in "exceptional situations"
such as when "important public policy" is at issue); Hobbs v. Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co., 195 F. Supp. 56, 61-64 (N.D. Ind. 1956) (rejecting renvoi for
circuity, inconsistency with prevailing choice-of-laws doctrines, and general lack
of acceptance by American courts); Nixon v. Allstate Ins. Co., 818 F. Supp.
215, 216 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that court may employ renvoi "once" and
look to whole law of Kentucky, where actions leading to tort claim occurred,
and because Kentucky follows most significant relationships test, internal law
of Ohio, where plaintiffs resided and insurance contract at issue was formed,
must be applied without further reference), appeal dismissed, 991 F.2d 796
(6th Cir. 1993); see also EuGrEN F. ScosS ET. AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§
3.13 n.4 (2d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1994).
175. American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d
1295 (1995). Prior to American Motorists, the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland had suggested the use of renvoi when lex loci contractus
yielded a result inconsistent with the state's public policy. See Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1989).
176. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 563-64, 659 A.2d at 1296-97.
177. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
731, 642 A.2d 896, 897 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
178. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 563, 590, 659 A.2d at 1296, 1310. The
Site was operated by the Baltimore Paint and Color Works from 1946 to 1960.
See ARTRA Group, 100 Md. App. at 731, 642 A.2d at 897. In 1960, the Site
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In 1980, the Site was sold to the Sherwin-Williams Company
(Sherwin-Williams).179 After the sale, Sherwin-Williams determined
that the soil and groundwater at the Site were heavily contaminated
with hazardous and toxic wastes.180 Sherwin-Williams was required
by state law to remedy this contamination. 8' Sherwin-Williams al-
leged that ARTRA and its predecessors had "negligently, illegally,
and improperly" stored thousands of drums of hazardous and toxic
chemicals at the Site, and that hazardous materials were leaking from
the drums and contaminating the soil and groundwater.8 2 Over fifty
underground storage tanks, many of which were leaking hazardous
substances such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and volatile organic spirits,
were also on the premises at the time of the sale to Sherwin-
Williams.'83 Sherwin-Williams further alleged that during normal
plant operations over a several year period, ARTRA and its prede-
cessors: (1) "improperly and negligently" overfilled the underground
storage tanks, causing hazardous materials to spill and contaminate
the soil and groundwater; and (2) discharged hazardous and toxic
substances into the storm drains at the Site, also causing soil and
groundwater contamination. 184
B. The Underlying Action
In December 1991, Sherwin-Williams filed suit against ARTRA
and other prior owners of the Site in the United States District Court
was purchased by the Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corporation. See id. In
1975, the Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corporation became part of ELT,
Inc. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564 n.1, 659 A.2d at 1297 n.l. ELT,
Inc., formerly known as El-Tronics, Inc., changed its name to Dutch Boy,
Inc. in 1977. See Standard & Poor's Corporate Descriptions Plus News Library,
Aug. 23, 1996, available in WESTLAW, USPUB file. Dutch Boy, Inc. changed
its name to ARTRA Group, Inc. in 1981. See ARTRA Group, 100 Md. App.
at 731, 642 A.2d at 897.
179. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 563-64, 659 A.2d at 1296.
180. See id. at 564, 590-91, 659 A.2d at 1297, 1310.
181. See id. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297. The owner or operator of a site containing
hazardous waste is responsible for the pollution regardless of negligence or
fault. See MD. CODE ANN., ENviR. § 7-201(x)(1)-(2) (1996). The state may seek
injunctive relief against a responsible party to prevent a threatened release of
pollution, or require that the responsible party remedy the contamination. See
id. § 7-222(a)(2)(iii). The state may also remedy the contamination itself using
funding from the Hazardous Substance Control Fund and then order the
responsible party to reimburse the state for the cost of the remedial actions.
See id. §§ 7-220, 7-221(a)-(b), 7-222(a)(2)(iii). See also supra note 40 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Comprehensive Environmental
Response and Liability Act (CERCLA).
182. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 590, 659 A.2d at 1310.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 590-91, 659 A.2d at 1310.
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for the District of Maryland, asserting claims for cost recovery,
compensatory damages, and declaratory relief relating to damages
Sherwin-Williams allegedly incurred as a result of the contamination
at the Site. 8 5 After receiving the complaint of the underlying action,
ARTRA requested that American Motorists, which had issued nine
yearly comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies to ARTRA,
defend and indemnify ARTRA in the underlying action. 8 6 The in-
surance policies were delivered to and executed by ARTRA in Illinois,
the state where both American Motorists and ARTRA maintained
headquarters. 187
American Motorists refused to defend or indemnify ARTRA,
citing the pollution exclusion clause contained in each policy which
precluded coverage for damages resulting from the discharge of
pollution unless the release of pollutants was sudden and accidental.188
C. The Case in the Court of Appeals of Maryland
1. Conflict of Laws
After granting certiorari, 8 9 the Court of Appeals of Maryland
reversed the court of special appeals, 19 holding that Maryland law
185. See ARTRA Group, 110 Md. App. at 732-33, 642 A.2d at 899.
186. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297.
187. See id.
188. See id. at 565, 659 A.2d at 1297. The pollution exclusion clause contained in
the CGL policies issued by American Motorists to ARTRA is reproduced and
discussed supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
189. See ARTRA Group, 100 Md. App. at 728, 642 A.2d at 896.
190. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 582, 659 A.2d at 1306. ARTRA argued
at trial that the insurance policy must be interpreted under Illinois law, under
which the pollution exclusion exception had been held to be ambiguous, because
of Maryland's adherence to lex loci contractus. See id. at 565, 659 A.2d at
1297; see also Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d
12D4, 1220 (Ill. 1992) (holding pollution exclusion exception ambiguous under
Illinois law). See generally cases cited supra notes 21, 45-54. American Motorists
claimed that the trial court should apply renvoi and look to both the substantive
law and conflicts principles of Illinois. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at
566, 659 A.2d at 1297. American Motorists asserted that Illinois would apply
Maryland law as the law of the state with the most significant relationships to
the litigation. See id. at 566, 659 A.2d at 1297-98 (discussing Bentz v. Mutual
Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 38 Md. App. 524, 537-39, 575 A.2d 795, 801-
03 (1990) (holding pollution exclusion exception unambiguous under Maryland
law)). The trial court concluded that although the place of contracting was
Illinois, Maryland's strong public policy on environmental issues mandated the
application of Maryland law to the dispute. See American Motorists, 338 Md.
at 566-67, 659 A.2d at 1298. The trial court ultimately held that the pollution
exclusion exception was unambiguous, that there was no potentiality of cov-
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applied to the policies. 191 The court of appeals stated that Maryland
would adopt a limited form of the renvoi doctrine and apply its own
substantive law where the choice-of-law principles of the state where
a contract was formed would not apply its own law but would specify
the application of Maryland law . 92 The court of appeals also reversed
the intermediate appellate court on the issue of the applicability of
the insurance policies, stating that under Maryland law American
Motorists had no duty to defend or indemnify ARTRA. 93
The basis of the court of appeals's holding on the issue of
renvoi was that, although there was no strong Maryland public policy
on the issue sub judice, it was absurd for Maryland courts to apply
the substantive law of another state when that state's courts would
themselves apply Maryland law. 94 The court noted that lex loci
contractus is applied in the interest of "simplicity, predictability, and
erage, and consequently, no duty to defend. See id. (citing Bentz, 83 Md.
App. at 537-38, 575 A.2d at 801-02).
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the trial court. See
ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 735,
742, 642 A.2d 896, 899, 903 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
The ARTRA Group court rejected American Motorists's argument that Mary-
land followed renvoi and stated that lex loci contractus was still the contractual
choice-of-law doctrine of the state. See id. at 736-37, 642 A.2d at 900-01. The
court of special appeals further held that although Maryland has a strong
public policy in protecting its resources and citizens from pollution, that policy
did not extend to determining liability for the costs of pollution, an issue
which the court stated was controlled by the insurance contract. See id. at
738-39, 642 A.2d at 901. While not stating that Maryland law was inapplicable
to the case, the court of special appeals found that the trial judge and American
Motorists had confused renvoi with the public policy exception to lex loci
contractus. See id. at 737, 642 A.2d at 901; see also supra note 165. But cf.
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1253-54 (D.
Md. 1989) (implying that renvoi and the public policy exception to lex loci
contractus may be identical). The court stated that where the state in which
the contract was made would apply the law of the forum because of the
forum's strong public policy regarding the issue, the forum is properly adhering
to lex loci contractus by applying its own law. See ARTRA Group, 100 Md.
App. at 737, 642 A.2d at 901.
The court of special appeals also alluded to the "microanalysis" character-
ization of the contamination by stating that "at least some" of the pollution
releases at the Site might have occurred under circumstances that could be
considered "sudden and accidental" irrespective of whether Illinois or Maryland
law applied to the policy. Id. at 739-40, 642 A.2d at 902.
191. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 581, 659 A.2d at 1305.
192. See id. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
193. See id. at 593-94, 659 A.2d at 1311-12.
194. See id. at 578-79, 659 A.2d at 1304. The court stated that the adoption of a
limited form of renvoi "allow[s] Maryland courts to avoid the irony of
applying" another state's law when that state would itself apply Maryland law.
Id. The court stated that "[iut is axiomatic that Maryland law is Maryland
law." Id. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1303.
[Vol. 26
American Motorists v. ARTRA Group, Inc.
uniformity.' ' 95 In other words, it promotes an easily determinable
outcome which will not vary depending upon which jurisdiction
litigates the claim. '9 However, when the use of lex loci contractus
would lead to differences in the result of the litigation depending on
which forum was chosen, the doctrine should not be followed, and
Maryland law should be applied instead. 97
The court of appeals based this principle on its belief that it is
preferable for Maryland courts to apply Maryland substantive law
in lieu of the law of another jurisdiction when it represents the "best
of available alternatives." 98 Principles of comity, however, may
weigh in favor of the application of the substantive law of another
state if there is a compelling reason, such as another state's significant
interest in an issue being litigated in a Maryland court.199 If the state
where the contract is made, however, would itself apply Maryland
law, it cannot be said that the foreign state's significant interests are
harmed by Maryland's decision to apply its own law to the case. 200
The court thus held that where the courts of the situs of contracting
would apply Maryland law, Maryland should apply its own law
because this practice will reduce incentives for forum shopping and
promote consistency of outcome. 201
The court of appeals acknowledged the potential problem of an
endless cycle inherent in the logic of the renvoi doctrine, 20 2 but stated
that the limited form adopted by the court would not lead to that
result.23 The court addressed three commonly advanced reasons for
rejection of renvoi: (1) renvoi is simply a "manipulative device" to
allow courts to explain the application of foreign law; (2) state
sovereignty precludes applying the choice-of-law rules of another
jurisdiction; and (3) the circularity of reasoning in renvoi will do
nothing but obfuscate the already murky choice-of-law doctrine.2
The American Motorists court noted that legal scholars have rejected
these contentions because the first two objections fail to recognize
that consistency of decisions between jurisdictions is a primary goal
of conflict of laws, and the third objection overlooks the fact that
there may be no real conflict resulting in circularity because the
195. See id. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1304.
196. See id.
197. See id. at 577, 659 A.2d at 1303.
198. See id. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1303.
199. See id. at 578, 659 A.2d at 1304.
200. See id. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304.
201. See id. at 577-78, 659 A.2d at 1303.
202. See id. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302; see supra notes 150-59 (discussing problems
with the renvoi doctrine and solutions thereto).
203. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 574, 659 A.2d at 1302.
204. See id. (citing SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13).
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referenced jurisdiction may itself apply the law of the forum.2 5 The
problem of circularity can itself be avoided by: (1) the application
of the law of the jurisdiction with the most significant contacts; or
(2) "for ease of application and to prevent forum shopping," the
substantive law of the forum.206 In American Motorists there was no
real conflict of law because Maryland was the jurisdiction with the
most significant contacts to the litigation, and the court of appeals
believed that an Illinois court would have applied Maryland law. 207
Therefore, the court of appeals concluded that Maryland shouldapply its own substantive law.208
In reversing the decision below, the American Motorists court




in which the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
suggested that Maryland courts consider the use of renvoi.210 The
court of appeals stated that the goals of consistency and prevention
of forum shopping merit the application of renvoi as suggested in
Travelers when the state of contract formation would itself apply
Maryland law.
21'
The court of appeals rejected the argument that because ARTRA
reasonably expected Maryland, adhering to lex loci contractus, to
apply Illinois substantive law to the case, it was unfair for the court
of appeals to do otherwise.2 12 The American Motorists court described
this claim as "unpersuasive" because if the action had been filed in
Illinois, the court would have applied the law of Maryland as the
state with the most significant relationship to the litigation.
213
Although the court of appeals stated that its holding was not
an abandonment of the lex loci contractus doctrine, the court noted
that there was "growing support" for the adoption of the approach
of section 188 of the Second Restatement in lieu of the traditional
doctrine. 2 4 The support for the approach of the Second Restatement,
205. See id. at 575, 659 A.2d at 1302 (citing SCOLES & HAY, supra note 93, § 3.13);
see also supra notes 153-59 (discussing solutions to problems with renvo).
206. American Motorists, 338 Md. at 575-76, 659 A.2d at 1302.
207. See id. at 575-77, 659 A.2d at 1302-03; see also supra note 158.
208. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 575-76, 659 A.2d at 1302-03.
209. 718 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Md. 1989).
210. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 575-76, 659 A.2d at 1302 (citing Travelers
Indem., 718 F. Supp. at 1254). See also supra notes 153-72 for a discussion
of Travelers Indem.
211. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 575-79, 659 A.2d at 1302-04; see supra
note 159.
212. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 577-78, 659 A.2d at 1303.
213. See id. The court cites this assumption - that Illinois law would be followed
by Maryland courts, but presumably not by Illinois courts - as an example
of the type of forum shopping to be eliminated by Maryland's adoption of
renvoi. See id.
214. See id. at 579-80, 659 A.2d at 1304-05.
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the court of appeals noted, is attributable to modern business prac-
tices, such as electronic commerce. 2 5 These practices have reduced
the significance of the place where a contract was completed and
increased the likelihood that adherence to the traditional lex loci
contractus doctrine will lead to an arbitrary result.
216
The American Motorists court noted that Maryland had already
recognized some exceptions to lex loci contractus.217 The court also
noted that if other jurisdictions continue to abandon lex loci con-
tractus for the most significant relationships test, Marylarid courts
may, in the future, do the same.
218
2. The Insurance Issue
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland held that the alle-
gations in the Sherwin-Williams complaint gave rise to a potentiality
of coverage regardless of whether Illinois or Maryland law was
applied. 2 9 The court of appeals reversed and held that: (1) Maryland
law was applicable; and (2) the Sherwin-Williams complaint was
insufficient to give rise to a potentiality of coverage. 220 Maryland's
high court rejected the lower court's "microanalysis" approach be-
cause such an analysis would permit the exception to nullify the
entire exclusion clause.221
The American Motorists court cited other state and federal
cases, 222 as well as the court's decision in Bentz223 under which
215. See id. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305; see also supra note 105.
216. See supra note 215.
217. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305; see also supra
note 105.
218. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 581, 659 A.2d at 1305. With this decision,
the court recognized the "limited renvoi exception" as well as the public policy
exception and the contractual choice of law described in section 187 of the
Second Restatement. See id. See also supra note 102 for a discussion of the
latter exceptions.
219. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
740, 642 A.2d 896, 902 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
220. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 581, 592-94, 659 A.2d at 1305, 1311-12.
221. See id. at 586, 659 A.2d at 1308.
222. See, e.g., Smith v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 22 F.3d 1432, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding "sudden and accidental" exception contains element of "temporal
brevity" and rejecting microanalysis theory); Bureau of Engraving, Inc. v.
Federal Ins. Co., 5 F.3d 1175, 1177-78 (8th Cir. 1993) (affirming trial court's
finding that coverage was precluded for damage caused by releases of contam-
inants from barrels leaking over 10 year period and rejecting "discharge-by-
discharge" theory); Ray Indus., Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 754,
768-69 (6th Cir. 1992) (refusing to adopt microanalysis approach and holding
that routine releases of pollution are not "sudden"); A. Johnson & Co. v.
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 933 F.2d 66, 75 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to adopt
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continuous releases of pollution during normal operations were deemed
not to be "sudden and accidental."22 The court noted that the term
microanalysis approach and holding that contamination through continuous
release of waste produced by insured over two-year period was not "sudden
and accidental"); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Star Fire Coals, Inc.,
856 F.2d 31, 34-35 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that "sudden" implies temporal
aspect and that discharge of pollutants on a continuous basis over several-year
period as part of insured's normal operation was not "sudden"); Great Lakes
Container Corp. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 727 F.2d 30, 33-34 (1st Cir.
1984) (finding that "sudden and accidental" was not ambiguous and no
coverage for damage resulting from pollution produced in normal business
practices); Anaconda Minerals v. Stoller Chem., 773 F. Supp. 1498, 1507 (D.
Utah 1991) (stating that "intentional and routine discharges" of contaminants
are not sudden and accidental), alf'd, 990 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1993); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 734 F. Supp. 437, 446-47
(D. Kan. 1990) (stating that "[to divorce 'sudden' of its temporal component
would eviscerate it of any independent meaning or force" and holding that
exception clause applies only if release of pollutants is "brief or short" as well
as "unexpected" or "unanticipated"); American Motorists Ins. Co. v. General
Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan. 1987) (holding coverage was
precluded for "continuous and repeated exposures" to pollution), aff'd, 946
F.2d 1482 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated on other grounds, 946 F.2d 1489 (10th
Cir. 1991); Borden, Inc. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 682 F. Supp. 927, 930
(S.D. Ohio 1987) (finding "sudden" unambiguous and holding that coverage
was precluded when pollutants were released on regular basis over six year
period), aff'd, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1989); Fischer & Porter Co. v. Liberty
Mut. Ins. Co., 656 F. Supp. 132, 140 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (citing Techalloy Co.
v. Reliance Ins. Co., 487 A.2d 820 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984) (holding that
contamination resulting from "continuous dumping of toxic chemicals ... is
not sudden, even if ... the spillage was accidental or the resulting damage
unexpected")); Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
815, 841 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that "sudden" contains temporal element
of quickness and that gradual release of pollutants was not sudden); Truck
Ins. Exchange v. Pozzuoli, 21 Cal. Rptr. 2d 650, 652 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)
(holding continuous pollution not "sudden"); Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Belleville Indus., Inc., 555 N.E.2d 568, 572 (Mass. 1990) (holding that "sud-
den" has a temporal meaning of abruptness and that gradual releases of
pollution were not "sudden"); Landauer, Inc. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 628
N.E.2d 1300, 1302-03 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994) (citing Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v.
SCV Services, Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1346, 1349 (Mass. 1992)) (rejecting microa-
nalysis approach and holding that "sudden" has a temporal element of
abruptness); Sylvester Bros. Dev. Co. v. Great Centennial Ins. Co., 503 N.W.2d
793, 796-97 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (stating that "sudden" implies temporal
aspect of "abruptness" and holding that pollution of groundwater occurring
"over two decades cannot reasonably be considered 'sudden"'); Hybud Equip.
Corp. v. Sphere Drake Ins. Co., 597 N.E.2d 1096, 1103 (Ohio 1992) (holding
that use of term 'sudden' readily indicates" that the exception is not applicable
to releases of pollution occurring over protracted period of time).
223. See Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine, & Inland Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 524, 537-
38, 575 A.2d 795, 801-02 (1990).
224. See American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 586-
93, 659 A.2d at 1295, 1308-11 (1995).
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"sudden and accidental" was neither inherently ambiguous nor ambig-
uous in the context of the exception clause and that "sudden" necessarily
implied a temporal element which must be construed as "abrupt" or
"instantaneous. '" 225 As such, the allegations of pollution at the Site,
which occurred over a number of years and through normal operations,
could not be considered "sudden and accidental.
'226
The court of special appeals had stated that American Motorists's
duty to defend ARTRA could not be determined before trial because
the allegations in the Sherwin-Williams action may have given rise to
such a duty, and, therefore, the trial judge's granting of summary
judgment to American Motorists on the declaratory judgment was
erroneous. 227 The court of appeals held, however, that since the "sudden
and accidental" exception applied only to releases of pollution which
occurred instantaneously, the allegations in the Sherwin-Williams com-
plaint, asserting that the polluting events occurred over a period of
many years, were insufficient to raise a potentiality of coverage.2 The
court of appeals reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment
for American Motorists and held that it had no duty to defend or
indemnify ARTRA against the Sherwin-Williams action.229
In a dissenting opinion criticizing the majority's adoption of
renvoi, Judge Raker recited the often-quoted humorous verse of
"The Chorus of Conflict of Laws, ' 230 skewering both the confusion
225. See id. at 583-84, 659 A.2d at 1306 (citing Bentz, 83 Md. App. at 537-38, 540,
575 A.2d at 801-03).
226. See id. at 592-93, 659 A.2d at 1311.
227. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
740-01, 642 A.2d 896, 902 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995);
see also American Motorists, 338 Md. at 583-84, 659 A.2d at 1306 (discussing
Bentz, 83 Md. App. at 540, 575 A.2d at 803).
228. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 593-94, 659 A.2d at 1311-12.
229. See id. at 594, 659 A.2d at 1311-12.
230. The text of the Chorus of Conflicts of Laws reads:
CONFLICT OF LAWS with its peppery seasoning,
Of pliable, scarcely reliable reasoning,
Dealing with weird and impossible things,
Such as marriage and domicil, bastards and kings,
All about courts without jurisdiction,
Handing out misery, pain and affliction,
Making defendant, for reasons confusing,
Unfounded, ill-grounded, but always amusing,
Liable one place but not in another
Son of his father, but not of his mother,
Married in Sweden, but only a lover in
Pious dominions of Great Britain's sovereign.
Blithely upsetting all we've been taught,
Rendering futile our methods of thought,
Till Reason, tottering down from her throne,
And Common Sense, sitting, neglected, alone,
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inherent in conflict of laws and the uncertainty of outcome that
exists under the policy-oriented approach of the Second Restate-
Cry out despairingly, "Why do you hate us?
Give us once more our legitimate status."
Ah, Students, bewildered, don't grasp at such straws,
But join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
Chorus
Beale, Beale, wonderful Beale,
Not even in verse can we tell how we feel,




For the law is a system of
Wheels within wheels
Invented by Sayres and Thayers and Beales
With each little whee
So exactly adjusted,
That if it goes haywire
The whole thing is busted.
So Hail to Profanity,
Goodbye to Sanity,
Lost if you stop to consider or pause.
On with the frantic, romantic, pedantic,
Effusive, abusive, illusive, conclusive,
Evasive, persuasive Conflict of Laws
THuRmAN ARNOLD, FAIR FIGHTS AND FOUL: A DISSENTING LAWYER'S LIFE, 21-
22 (1965) (footnotes omitted).
Second Verse:
If Arnold thought reason had gone from its throne
Clear back in '14, 0 now how he'd groan
For Babcock and Jackson had a terrible row
And seeds of new policy surely did sow.
The seeds were from plants nursed in academia's groves
And from '20 to '60 grew in great droves;
But, once out of the classroom and into the courts
The profuse little seedlings grew into sports.
Though the new growth was reason supplanting mere rites
When growing in Academe's neat little sites;
In real rows the neat rows fit nothing quite right,
And we often get darkness instead of new light.
But if light be our metaphor, mixed as it is,
Old light was dimmer and fuzzy as fizz;
Nothing it showed but shadow to fools
Who mistake simple outlines for the sureness of rules.
Now New light makes "sense" always the goal
And explores each case nuance with the Restated tools
So, Lawyers, relax, break up the old straws,
And join in the chorus of Conflict of Laws.
McLaughlin, supra note 109, at 108 n.65; see also supra note 97.
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ment. 231 The dissent chastised the majority as merely adding uncer-
tainty to Maryland's conflict-of-laws rules by eroding the traditional
rule of lex loci contractus.2 2 Judge Raker regarded the adoption of
renvoi as an absurd qualification of the consistency and predictability
of lex loci contractus.233 In addition, Judge Raker argued that it
could not be determined with certainty whether an Illinois court
would have found that Illinois had the most significant contacts to
the litigation and applied its own law.2 34 The dissenting judge con-
demned the majority opinion explaining that its holding was contrary
to the stated objectives of Maryland's conflict-of-laws doctrine of
achieving certainty, predictability, and consistency.
235
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Conflict of Laws
1. Effect on Maryland Law
The American Motorists decision evidences a continuing erosion
of Maryland's adherence to the lex loci contractus doctrine. Origi-
nally, Maryland recognized only one exception to lex loci contractus
- the public policy exception. 23 6 A second exception was recognized
in Kronovet v. Lipchin.23 7 There, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
adopted section 188 of the Second Restatement and recognized that
parties to a contract could specify which jurisdiction's law would
govern the contract. 23 A third exception to lex loci contractus has
now been established: when a Maryland court believes that the state
whose law would govern the contract under lex loci contractus would
231. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 594-96, 659 A.2d at 1312-13 (Raker, J.,
dissenting).
232. See id. at 596-97, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J., dissenting).
233. See id. (Raker, J., dissenting).
234. See id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J., dissenting). The dissent cited a
number of decisions in which the law of a state other than the one in which
the insured risk was located was held to control an insurance policy dispute.
See id. at 597 n.2, 659 A.2d at 1313 n.2 (Raker, J., dissenting); see also, e.g.,
Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 968,
972-73 (D.D.C. 1991) (holding that state of location of headquarters of insured,
rather than state where environmental damage occurred, was state with most
significant contacts).
235. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313.
236. See supra note 102.
237. 288 Md. 30, 415 A.2d 1096 (1980).
238. See id. at 46, 415 A.2d at 1105-06.
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itself apply Maryland law to the case, the court may apply Maryland
law.2
39
While the court of appeals stated that it does not yet intend to
abandon lex loci contractus,m° the American Motorists holding is
tantamount to the court of appeals constructive adoption of the
approach of section 188 of the Second Restatement, but only for the
promotion of Maryland law over other states' law.?' If a contractual
conflict-of-laws issue comes before a Maryland court involving a
contract made in a state which has adopted section 188 of the Second
Restatement, but with interests in Maryland, the court may find that
Maryland has the most significant contacts with the litigation, and
then use renvoi to justify applying Maryland law in lieu of the other
state's law. 242
On the other hand, if there is a conflict-of-laws problem where
the place of contracting is Maryland but there are substantial interests
in other states which would justify the application of another state's
law, Maryland courts will still apply Maryland law under the doctrine
of lex loci contractus.23 In short, under the American Motorists
239. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 573, 659 A.2d at 1301.
240. See id. at 573, 659 A.2d at 1301.
241. See id. at 572-73, 659 A.2d at 1301 (discussing application of Restatement's
test). The court's stated position is that the application of a "limited renvoi
exception" will allow for the application of Maryland law when the state where
a contract was formed would presumably apply Maryland substantive law as
the law of the state with the most significant relationships to the litigation.
See id. However, the court of appeals did not indicate that the converse was
true: if Maryland was the lex loci contractus but another, state had the most
significant relationship, a Maryland court would still be bound to apply the
law of Maryland as the place where the contract was made. See infra note 243
and accompanying text; see also infra text accompanying note 246.
242. A less openly biased approach than that discussed supra note 241 would be
for a Maryland court to always find that Maryland has the most significant
relationships to the contract. Before this could be done, however, Maryland
would have to adopt section 188 of the Second Restatement. Another possibility
would be for Maryland to take the approach of Leflar's "choice-influencing"
considerations, discussed supra note 110 and determine that Maryland has the
better rule of law. These approaches, however, have the drawback of destroying
the inherent predictability and simplicity of lex loci contractus.
243. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 578-80, 659 A.2d at 1303-05. The court
stated that Maryland should utilize the limited renvoi exception to apply the
substantive law of Maryland to contracts formed in other states when Maryland
has the most significant relationship to the contract issue being litigated and
the place of contracting would apply Maryland law (under section 188 of the
Second Restatement) to the contract in lieu of that state's own law. See id. at
579, 659 A.2d at 1304. The court continued, however, that its holding was
"not a total jettisoning of lex loci contractus." Id. If Maryland is the place
of contracting but some other state has the most significant relationship to the
contract issue presented, a Maryland court that applies Maryland law to the
contract will be acting within the limits of American Motorists because Mar-
yland still follows lex loci contractus. See supra note 241.
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holding, Maryland courts have the best of both worlds: applying
Maryland law when the place of contracting is Maryland, even though
other states may have a more significant interest in the litigation and
also applying Maryland law when the place of contracting is another
state, but a Maryland court believes Maryland has a more significant
interest in the litigation. This approach defeats the comity purpose
of conflict of laws by creating a situation under which it is almost
certain that Maryland courts will apply Maryland law to the prejudice
of other states. 2"
Moreover, in American Motorists, as Judge Raker pointed out,
Illinois may have determined that Illinois, not Maryland, had the
most significant contacts to the litigation.245 Only two of the five
"contacts" described in section 188 of the Second Restatement
weighed in favor of the determination that Maryland had the most
significant contacts in this case. 2 The place of contracting was
Illinois, the policies were countersigned in Illinois, and both American
Motorists and ARTRA have their headquarters located in Illinois .
247
Although the contaminated site in this litigation was located in
Maryland, ARTRA also operates facilities in other states. 2" To be
244. See supra note 94. Comity is the doctrine under which courts recognize the
validity of rights created by the laws of another jurisdiction. See supra note
99. A forum may decline to recognize rights granted by the laws of another
state because the laws of the foreign jurisdiction are inconsistent with the
forum's stated public policy or because the parties have agreed in advance as
to which jurisdiction's law will govern their contract. See generally supra notes
93-99. If Maryland courts, however, consistently refuse without plausible
explanation to recognize rights created under the laws of another jurisdiction,
it may antagonize other states (and countries) and encourage them to do the
same. Were this situation to occur, it may have a detrimental effect on Maryland
citizens and corporations doing interstate or international business. See generally
supra notes 93-99.
245. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 597, 659 A.2d at 131 (Raker, J., dis-
senting).
246. See supra note 109. Because this facility is located in Maryland, the factors of
the place of performance and the location of the subject matter weigh in favor
of application of Maryland law. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564, 659
A.2d at 1296-97 (discussing location of facility in Maryland).
247. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1296-97. It has been
held that the state where an insured's headquarters are located may constitute
the state with the most significant contacts to the litigation. See Potomac Elec.
Power Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 968, 972-73 (D.D.C.
1991) (holding that the state where the insured's headquarters are located,
rather than the state where environmental damage occurred, was the state with
most significant contacts to the dispute).
248. ARTRA Group, Inc. is a diversified industrial corporation engaged in the
manufacture of products such as paper and plastic packaging, foil, paper bags,
costume jewelry and novelties, as well as the operation of women's accessory
and specialty stores. ARTRA currently operates facilities in Georgia, Illinois,
1996l
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sure, section 193 of the Second Restatement asserts that the law of
the state in which the insured risk is located will normally govern
insurance contracts. 249 The contact of the two companies with Illinois
is quite strong, however, and it would not be unreasonable for an
Illinois judge to find that Illinois had the most significant contacts
with this litigation30
2. Alternative Courses of Action
A more equitable alternative would have been for Maryland to
simply adopt sections 188 and 193 of the Second Restatement and
abandon lex loci contractus. The approach of the Second Restatement
has been criticized for being less certain than lex loci contractus.
25
More predictability and fairness would exist, however, if a Maryland
court determined that Maryland had more significant contacts to an
issue of litigation than in this situation, where a Maryland court
determined that an Illinois court would think that Maryland had
more significant contacts with the litigation than did Illinois. 2 2 One
Kansas, Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island. Standard &
Poor's Corporate Descriptions Plus News, Jan. 15, 1996, available in NEXIS,
COMPANY Library, USPUB File.
249. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFICT OF LAWS § 193 (1971); see also supra
note 115.
250. See supra notes 247-48; see also Sandefer Oil & Gas, Inc. v. AIG Oil Rig of
Texas, Inc., 846 F.2d 319, 324 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding the location of insured
risk less important when location of risk is scattered throughout two or more
states); Gould, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 822 F. Supp. 1172, 1176 (E.D.
Pa. 1993) (holding that Illinois had a more significant relationship to the claim
than Pennsylvania even though the lawsuit was brought to recover the costs
of cleanup at a Pennsylvania site because of the following Illinois contacts: (1)
place of performance of insurance policy "unless the policy explicitly provides
otherwise, is where the premiums are received"; (2) policies were negotiated
and entered into in Illinois by parties domiciled or headquartered in Illinois;
and (3) the insurance coverage was for facilities located in several states,
including Pennsylvania).
251. See 16 Am. JuR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 83 (1979).
252. See, e.g., Gould, 822 F. Supp. at 1176. While the Gould court considered the
fact that the insured risk was located in several states, the American Motorists
court did not address this issue. It appears that ARTRA has facilities in other
states which might have been covered by this insurance policy. See supra note
248. Furthermore, the Gould court held that Pennsylvania, the site of the risk,
no longer had a strong interest in the litigation because the pollution had
already been cleaned up. See Gould, 822 F. Supp. at 1176. In addition, as the
Potomac Electric court stated, the argument for applying the law of the state
where the contamination occurred would have been stronger if it had concerned
the insurer's liability for cleaning up the contamination rather than simply
whether the insurer was liable for costs incurred by the insured in cleaning up
the polluted site, which had already been remedied. See Potomac Elec. Power
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state's court, in attempting to speak for another, may look at the
issues differently and may not consider all of the relevant interests
which the other state would consider. 253 In this case, the court of
appeals has no rational basis to speak for Illinois's choice-of-law
determination.2 54 The court of appeals's decision could be considered
an affront to the courts of Illinois.
The reasoning of a "limited renvoi exception" is sure to vex the
courts of other states and may lead them to ignore Maryland's
significant interest in those states. It would be better for Maryland
to change its law so that a Maryland court would determine which
law should be applied by considering the significance of Maryland's
contacts with the litigation, rather than the lack of significance of
another state's contacts. Forum shopping would be reduced by Mary-
land's adoption of the policy-oriented approach of the Second Re-
statement. Fairness would be promoted by considering which state
has the most significant contacts as opposed to arbitrarily choosing
the law of the state where the contract was created or applying a
self-centered analysis of another state's interests.
25
1
Co. v. California Union Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 968, 972 n.10 (D.D.C. 1991).
Because the pollution at the Site had been remedied by Sherwin-Williams, this
case presented a similar situation to that in Gould and Potomac Electric.
American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 564, 659
A.2d 1295, 1297 (1995). It has also been held that the jurisdiction where the
insured's headquarters and principal place of business are located is the
jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship to the litigation. See
Potomac Elec., 777 F. Supp. at 972-73. Furthermore, as the ARTRA Group
court stated, Maryland's strong public policy did not apply to who paid for
the clean-up; it only required that somebody pay for it. See ARTRA Group,
Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 739, 642 A.2d 896,
901. The court of appeals in American Motorists did not indicate that this
conclusion was erroneous. See generally American Motorists, 338 Md. at 573
n.3, 659 A.2d at 1301 n.3 (stating that reference to Illinois law under lex loci
contractus would not violate Maryland public policy).
253. See supra note 252. For example, other states have also considered the drafting
history of insurance policy language in the construction of policies. See, e.g.,
Morton Int'l Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 855-73
(N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 112 (1994) (holding that construction of
insurance policy in manner inconsistent with its representation to regulators
violated state's strong public policy in favor of "requiring regulation of the
insurance business in the public interest"); cf. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
Belleville Indus., 555 N.E.2d 568, 573 (Mass. 1990) (explicitly declining to
consider drafting history in construction of insurance policy).
254. See supra note 253.
255. See supra note 244. As stated by the American Motorists court, the application
of lex loci contractus has a tendency to lead to arbitrary and impractical
results. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 580, 659 A.2d at 1305. If Maryland
were to adopt the principles of section 188 of the Second Restatement, fairness
in assessing the relative interests of the jurisdictions involved would theoretically
be increased, possibly at the expense of certainty and predictability. See 16
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The other alternative would have been for the court of appeals
to follow lex loci contractus and apply Illinois law as the law of the
state where the contract was made. While the court may not have
been pleased with American Motorists being responsible for defending
ARTRA, an alleged long term polluter,256 consistency would have
been enhanced and forum shopping minimized. 25 7
3. Not an Equitable Decision
The court of appeals stated that ARTRA's assertion - that it
expected Illinois law to control the dispute under Maryland's doctrine
Am. Jum. 2D Conflict of Laws § 83 (1979). On the other hand, the American
Motorists holding arguably promotes certainty and predictability, but not
fairness, because the law applied under the "limited renvoi exception" will
almost invariably be the law of Maryland.
256. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 590-93, 659 A.2d at 1310-11.
257. See id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1313 (Raker, J., dissenting). It is the court of
appeals's halfway approach that promotes forum shopping and reduces con-
sistency. If the court fully adopted section 188 of the Second Restatement,
future defendants in other states, such as ARTRA, would know that Maryland
follows the Second Restatement's approach and could predict that Maryland
might determine that it has the most significant relationships to the litigation,
and thus apply Maryland law. If Maryland remained a lex loci contractus state,
out-of-state contract litigation defendants could predict that Maryland would
apply the law of the place of contracting. Under American Motorists, an out-
of-state contract litigant cannot predict whether Maryland will decide to apply
the law of the place of contracting, or if Maryland would determine that the
state of contracting would not apply its own law and apply Maryland law
instead. Furthermore, the approach of section 188 of the Second Restatement
is subjective, reducing certainty and predictability of outcome. See 16 AM.
JrR. 2D Conflict of Laws § 83 (1979). As a result, there may be a difference
between which jurisdiction the court of another state actually decides has the
most significant relationship to the litigation and which jurisdiction a Maryland
court, while assuming the role of that foreign court, would decide has the
most significant relationship to the litigation. See supra notes 252-54. As the
American Motorists court admitted, there is an inherent preference to apply
one's own substantive law. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 578, 659 A.2d
at 1303-04.
Far from preventing forum shopping, this decision appears to have been the
result of it and to have rewarded the plaintiff for doing so. American Motorists
did not file this action in Illinois court because an Illinois court would have
likely found Illinois to have the most significant relationships to the litigation.
See id. at 597, 659 A.2d at 1312; see also supra note 250. Illinois law was
definitely less favorable to American Motorists, while the Court of Appeals of
Maryland had not yet spoken on the insurance issue. See supra notes 82-92.
In addition, the court of special appeals had previously construed the "sudden
and accidental" exception in favor of the insurers. See supra notes 82-92. By
filing in Maryland and arguing for the adoption of renvoi, American Motorists
had some chance of prevailing in court. Furthermore, the current trend has
been towards a narrow judicial interpretation of the pollution exclusion. See
supra note 39. As such, American Motorists had a much better chance of
winning this suit in Maryland than in Illinois.
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of lex loci contractus - is the type of forum shopping that the
American Motorists court wished to eliminate. 25 This decision is
inequitable because it did not, and will not, protect parties' expec-
tations of which law will govern their contract disputes. Under
Maryland's doctrine of lex loci contractus, ARTRA's belief that
Illinois law would control the dispute was a reasonable belief.
2 9
American Motorists had no binding authority to support its conten-
tion that Maryland law should control this case, only the prediction
of a federal judge that Maryland courts might adopt renvoi.
260
In adopting a limited form of renvoi, but not the approach of
the Second Restatement, the court of appeals has gone halfway
towards an interest-balancing approach.26 Under the present law,
Maryland's interests are protected, but other states' interests are not.
If a contract is made outside of Maryland, but Maryland has more
significant interests, Maryland courts will apply Maryland law under
the renvoi doctrine. 262 If another state, however, has more significant
interests than Maryland, but the contract was made in Maryland,
Maryland courts will ignore that state's significant interests and apply
Maryland law under lex loci contractus.261 The decision is inequitable
because only Maryland interests are protected - there is no consid-
258. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 577-88, 659 A.2d at 1303.
259. Given the court of special appeals's conclusion that there was no strong public
policy at issue here, and the lack of an effective contractual choice of law by
the parties, Maryland law would have held that the law of Illinois, as the state
where the contract was made, would govern. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 739, 642 A.2d 896, 901
(1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995); see also Kramer v. Bally's
Park Place, Inc., 311 Md. 387, 390, 535 A.2d 466, 467 (1988) (applying lex
loci contractus).
260. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Allied-Signal, Inc., 718 F. Supp. 1252, 1253-54
(D. Md. 1989) (holding that Maryland may look to law of state referenced by
lex loci contractus to ascertain whether that state would refer to Maryland
substantive law). But see Eastern Stainless Corp. v. American Protection Ins.
Co., 829 F. Supp. 797, 800-01 (D. Md. 1983) (stating that Maryland would
apply renvoi only in "exceptional situations" such as when "important public
policy" was at issue).
261. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d at 1304. The limited renvoi
approach balances the interests of Maryland against that of other involved
states only in cases where the contract at issue was formed outside of Maryland.
See id. If the contract was formed outside of Maryland, and Maryland
determines that the state of contracting would apply Maryland law, Maryland
law will be applied. See id. However if a contract was formed in Maryland,
but another state has the most significant relationship to the contract, Maryland
law will be applied. See id.; see also supra notes 250 & 252.
262. See supra note 243. This could be viewed as the use of renvoi as a "manipulative
device." See supra notes 153, 159, 160, 167, 204 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 261.
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eration of other states' interests. 26 In order to promote fairness and
consistency, the court of appeals should clarify its position either by
adopting an interest-analysis approach such as that of Section 188
of the Second Restatement, or by returning to lex loci contractus in
all cases except where the parties have chosen the governing law in
their contract, or where Maryland's strong public policy precludes
the protection of an out-of-state interest.
4. Promotion of Forum Shopping
American Motorists commenced this action in Maryland 265 be-
cause Illinois law, following the Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.266 decision, was clearly unfavorable to Amer-
ican Motorists. 26 7 Maryland law, on the other hand, favored the
interests of American Motorists.6 In reality, American Motorists,
rather than ARTRA, engaged in forum shopping, and the outcome
of this decision rewarded American Motorists for doing So.
269
Forum shopping is further promoted by this decision because
plaintiffs who have contractual interests in both Maryland and an-
other state, and know that the other state's law is unfavorable, will
now be encouraged to file their actions in Maryland. If the contract
was made in Maryland, Maryland will apply its own law under lex
loci contractus °270 If the contract was executed elsewhere, the plaintiff
may be able to persuade a Maryland court that Maryland's contacts
are significant enough that Maryland should still apply its own law.
27
1
This decision will, therefore, actually lead to increased, rather than
decreased, forum shopping.
5. Maryland Courts Freedom to Apply Maryland Law Protects
Plaintiffs
Presuming that Maryland courts would rather apply Maryland
law than the law of another state, the American Motorists decision
264. See supra note 243. If a contract is formed in Maryland, but some other
jurisdiction has a more significant relationship with it, the American Motorists
court would consider that other jurisdiction's interest to be irrelevant and
would apply Maryland law as the lex loci contractus.
265. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 563, 659 A.2d at 1296.
266. 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992), modified 670 N.E.2d 740 (Ill. 1996).
267. See supra notes 44, 257.
268. See, e.g., Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co., 38 Md. App. 524,
537-39, 575 A.2d 795, 801-03 (1990); see also supra notes 190, 257.
269. See supra note 257.
270. See supra note 257.
271. See supra note 257; see also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group,
Inc., 338 Md. 560, 579, 659 A.2d 1295, 1304 (1995).
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will certainly aid Maryland courts. The court of special appeals's
conclusion that Maryland has no strong public policy concerning
who is liable for the costs of an environmental cleanup as long as
somebody pays for it makes sense.2 72 As stated above, however, this
decision in effect gives Maryland courts another "escape" from
applying the law of another state if they do not wish to do So. 2 73
This decision favors plaintiffs, such as American Motorists, who
find Maryland law more favorable to them than the law of another
state. Although a contract may have been made in another state, the
plaintiff who can demonstrate that Maryland has significant contacts
to the litigation may be able to persuade a Maryland court to follow
the American Motorists holding and apply Maryland law to the case,
rather than the law of the state where the contract was made. 274 The
converse, however, is not true; when a contract is made in a state
outside of Maryland, but Maryland has significant contacts with the
litigation, the defendant will not be able to avoid unfavorable Mary-
land substantive law by claiming that Maryland follows lex loci
contractus .275
Litigants on either side of a contractual conflict-of-laws dispute
to which Maryland law is favorable would be well-advised to make
the most of their Maryland contacts and, in so doing, may be able
to persuade a Maryland court to reject lex loci contractus in favor
of Maryland law and renvoi.
B. The Insurance Issue
1. Maryland Takes the Insurers' Position
The decision of the Court of Appeals of Maryland in American
Motorists brings Maryland into line with the large number of federal
and state courts that have held that the terms "sudden and acciden-
tal" in the pollution exclusion clause are unambiguous. 276 The court
held that coverage of damage caused by pollution is precluded unless
the release is quick or instantaneous, as well as unintended and
272. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
739, 642 A.2d 896, 901 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995); see
also supra note 252.
273. See supra notes 244, 255, 257, 261.
274. See supra note 257; see also American Motorists, 338 Md. at 579, 659 A.2d
at 1304.
275. See supra note 257.




unexpected. 277 In light of this decision, there will certainly be no
incentive for polluting policyholders to have their suits heard in
Maryland, although insurance companies such as American Motorists
will be encouraged to file suits involving this issue in Maryland.
2. The Debate Over "Sudden" Rages On
From a layman's point of view, sudden can mean either a quick
or instantaneous event, such as "a sudden flash of lightning," or an
unexpected but not instantaneous event, such as "suddenly it's
spring. ' 278 It has been suggested that an interpretation of "sudden"
as "unintended and unexpected" is more in keeping with the regu-
latory goals of insurance, as the ostensible purpose of environmental
insurance is to protect the insured against liability for damages
resulting from unintended and unexpected events .279 An interpretation
of "sudden" as "of short duration" or "instantaneous" results in
random coverage based on the fortuitous circumstances under which
the insured discovers the pollution release. 280 If the release is discov-
ered and corrected before a significant amount of time has passed,
277. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 586, 659 A.2d at 1308 (quoting American
Motorists Ins. Co. v. General Host Corp., 667 F. Supp. 1423, 1429 (D. Kan.
1987) (declining to adhere to the plain language of a comprehensive general
liability insurance policy which excluded coverage for pollution unless discharge
was sudden and accidental)); see also Bentz v. Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland
Ins. Co., 83 Md. App. 524, 537, 575 A.2d 795, 801-02 (1990) (agreeing with
the analysis in General Host, 667 F. Supp. at 1429).
278. One dictionary defines "sudden" as: (1) (a) happening or coming unexpectedly;
not foreseen or prepared for; (b) sharp or abrupt (a "sudden" turn in the
road); or (2) done, coming, or taking place quickly or abruptly; hasty. WEBS-
TER's NEw WORLD DICTIONARY OF THE AmERICAN LANGUAGE 1422 (David B.
Guralnik, ed., 2d ed. 1980). For example, in keeping with this definition, a
person whose illness worsens could be said to "have taken a 'sudden' turn for
the worse," although the worsening of the illness is not instantaneous and may
take days or weeks. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 619-20; see also
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831, 871
(N.J. 1993) (quoting Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 615-16), cert. denied,
510 U.S. 112 (1994); supra note 39. In addition, as noted above, in, the
commonly-used expression "a 'sudden' turn in the road," the word "sudden"
has no temporal meaning whatsoever. As such, an ordinary person could
conclude that "sudden" does not necessarily mean "quick" or "abrupt," and
could mean "unexpected" and unforeseen or "unintended." See generally
Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 614 (listing various dictionary definitions
of "sudden").
279. See supra note 42. "[A) business purchases CGL coverage largely to protect
against unexpected and unknown losses which may threaten its financial sur-
vival." Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 621 (emphasis added).
280. See supra note 42. "[A]n insured typically would not expect liability coverage
to depend on the duration of an occurrence." Ballard & Manus, supra note
29, at 621 (emphasis omitted).
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the release would be considered sudden, but if the insured does not
discover the pollution discharge until enough time passes that it could
be considered gradual, coverage will not be provided.
2 '
In light of these considerations, although it appears that a
nebulous temporal aspect surrounds the meaning of "sudden," it is
most consistent with the purpose of the insurance policy to construe
"sudden" as only "unintended and unexpected. ' 282
3. What Did the Insurers Really Intend "Sudden" to Mean?
While the logic of the court of appeals in determining that
"sudden" implied an event of a temporal nature is debatable, the
insurance industry was unclear, and possibly misleading, in its repre-
sentations to state insurance regulators of its purpose in drafting this
clause. 283 When seeking approval of the clause and its "sudden and
accidental" exception in 1970, the insurers stated by memorandum
that the purpose of the clause was to preclude coverage for damages
caused by environmental contamination when the damage was inten-
tional and expected. 28 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in consid-
ering the "drafting history" of the policy language, concluded that
the insurers' assertions that "sudden" in the context of the exception
must be interpreted as implying events of a temporal nature, were
tantamount to misrepresentation by the insurance industry to the
regulators, and therefore represented an unreasonable construction
of the scope of coverage.
285
Clearly, there are difficult considerations on both sides of this
issue. While the insurance industry may have been negligent or
misleading in its representation of the intended scope of coverage of
this clause, evidence of the insurer's intent in drafting the pollution
clause has been rejected as immaterial by one court because it was
281. See supra note 42. "[A]n insured would not logically believe that its protection
hinged on an accident's duration, because such coverage would provide whim-
sical protection instead of the business security sought by the CGL purchaser."
Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 622.
282. See supra note 42. "An interpretation of 'sudden and accidental' that provides
protection against abrupt, unexpected pollution events, and excludes from
coverage pollution events which the insured expects or intends, is consistent
with a reasonable insured's business goals in purchasing CGL insurance."
Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 621; see also supra notes 34, 36, 68
(discussing insurers' representations to regulators that the language was designed
to preclude liability only when the pollution was intended or expected).
283. See supra note 68.
284. See supra note 68.
285. See Morton Int'l, Inc. v. General Accident Ins. Co. of Am., 629 A.2d 831,
847-48, 854-55, 862, 870-71 (N.J. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 112 (1994); see
also supra note 68.
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not considered by the insured in purchasing the policy. 286 Because
the terms of insurance contracts are normally non-negotiable, the
argument rejecting the evidence of drafting intent appears flawed.
28 7
4. The "Microanalysis" Approach-Properly Rejected
The suggestion by the court of special appeals that "at least
some" of the discharges might be "sudden and accidental ' 288 was
properly rejected by the court of appeals. 2 9 This approach of re-
characterization of long-term gradual polluting practices as discrete,
"sudden" events is irrational and has been soundly rejected. 29°
5. Were the Allegations Too Extreme for the Polluter to Escape
Liability?
In light of allegations of the existence of numerous barrels of
hazardous materials and dozens of underground tanks filled with
toxic substances 2 91 it is difficult to believe that ARTRA's plant
officials did not expect these drums and tanks to eventually leak and
286. See supra note 68.
287. Far from being irrelevant because it was not considered by the policyholder
before purchasing the policy, the drafting history should be considered critical
because the policy language is non-negotiable, and the insurer is often in a
superior bargaining position. See supra notes 50, 283-86 and accompanying
text. The only protection the policyholder normally receives from unfair, poorly-
written, or misleading policy language is review of the policy forms by insurance
regulators. See Morton, 629 A.2d at 872-73 (holding it unfair to construe a
pollution-exclusion clause in manner inconsistent with insurers' representation
to state regulators and that such representations would violate state's "strong
public policy" of regulation for protection of the public interest, "and would
reward the industry for its misrepresentation and nondisclosure to state regu-
latory authorities").
288. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
742, 642 A.2d 896, 903 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
289. See American Motorist Ins. Co. v. ARTRA Group, Inc., 338 Md. 560, 593-
94, 659 A.2d 1295, 1311-12 (1995). The microanalysis approach appears not
to have received the support of any jurisdictions which have considered it. See
supra notes 71-73. In addition, the microanalysis theory itself does not address
the underlying question of whether "sudden" contains a temporal element. See
supra note 42. Because under the microanalysis theory, "sudden" does not
mean "unintended" or "unexpected," the microanalysis theory does not pro-
mote the goals of liability insurance and does not provide insureds the extent
of coverage which is provided by a definition of "sudden" as "unintended"
and "unexpected." See supra note 42.
290. See supra notes 71-73.
291. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 590-91, 659 A.2d at 1310. The complaint
alleged that when the underground storage tanks at the Site overflowed,
hazardous waste simply poured out onto the ground, and that other waste was
improperly discharged into storm drains.
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cause contamination. Perhaps the court believed that the scope of
the pollution and the allegations of careless dumping, were simply
too egregious to allow ARTRA to escape liability for its acts.
Federal, state, and local environmental regulations have placed
the burden of remedying environmental contamination primarily on
the polluters .292 The increasing general awareness of the great mag-
nitude of environmental damage that has occurred from practices
such as ARTRA's abandonment of barrels of toxic wastes signals a
need to reallocate the burden of environmental cleanup costs. This
reallocation may be accomplished through legislation, rather than
through the courts. It is quite possible that the general public may
be required to pay the majority of the costs of cleaning up contam-
inated waste sites in this country through increased taxes because
neither manufacturers nor insurers, alone or together, can shoulder
the expense.
Unless this occurs, however, the decision of whether insurers or
insureds must pay for environmental cleanups will be determined in
the courts through the interpretation of insurance contracts. In
considering the apparent intent of the insurers in adopting this
language, as well as the apparent ambiguity in "sudden," the rea-
sonable construction of the pollution exception would be that cov-
erage is precluded only when the pollution release that causes the
damages was intended and expected. 29 American Motorists would
therefore have a duty to defend ARTRA. If the allegations of the
releases of pollutants are correct, however, indemnity coverage should
be precluded only for those damages occurring from pollution which
was not unexpected or unintended.29
6. The Insureds' Attorney Should Emphasize Insurer's Intent, as
Well as Temporality of Pollution Releases
Policyholders involved in litigation with their insurance compa-
nies over this issue should bring the drafting history of the clause to
292. See Ballard & Manus, supra note 29, at 611-12.
293. See supra notes 34-36, 42, 68, 279, 282.
294. At least some of the allegations involved the intentional dumping of hazardous
waste. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 564, 659 A.2d at 1297. The
Sherwin-Williams complaint alleged that hazardous and toxic waste were spilled
"as a result of regular operations of the plant," and that materials were
discharged (apparently intentionally) into the storm drain system. ARTRA
Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728, 740, 642
A.2d 896, 902 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995). "In addition
to alleging that ARTRA and its predecessors negligently and illegally stored
... [hazardous waste] on the site ... Sherwin-Williams's complaint alleged,
inter alia, that spills of hazardous substances occurred as a result of regular
operations of the plant ... " Id. Damages resulting from any intentional or
expected releases of pollutants would not be covered under any construction
of the pollution exclusion clause. See supra notes 36, 42, 279.
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the attention of the court. Although the Lumbermens Mutual Ca-
sualty Co. v. Belleville Industrial, Inc.291 court rejected the evidence
of drafting history as immaterial to the case because it did not
influence the policyholder's decision to purchase the policy, 296 drafting
history does serve as strong evidence that the proper construction of
the exception is to preclude coverage only when the pollution release
is intended or expected.297
Policyholders should determine if the pollution release could
reasonably be viewed as instantaneous or short-lived and, if so,
emphasize that fact to the court.298 Insurers, in turn, should ascertain
the temporality of the pollution release and emphasize that pollution
releases which occur gradually and during the normal course of
business are not sudden and accidental.
299
7. The Alternative: Allow Coverage
If the court of appeals had held that under Maryland law
coverage was precluded only for intended and expected releases of
pollution, American Motorists would have lost the declaratory judg-
ment action and been required to defend ARTRA in the Sherwin-
Williams action.3°° If that had been the case, the choice-of-law issue
would have been moot because in Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty
Mutual Insurance Co.310 it was determined, under Illinois law, that
coverage was provided for damages resulting from unintended and
unexpected releases of pollution.3° This position is arguably more in
keeping with the insurers' expressed intent in adopting the policy
language, and therefore more equitable. The drafting history aside,
however, the majority of recent holdings support the insurer's posi-
tion.303
295. 555 N.E.2d 568 (Mass. 1990).
296. See supra note 68.
297. See supra notes 42, 68, 279-82, 287.
298. See American Motorists, 338 Md. at 586-93, 659 A.2d at 1308-11.
299. See id.
300. See ARTRA Group, Inc. v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 100 Md. App. 728,
740-41, 642 A.2d 896, 902 (1994), rev'd, 338 Md. 560, 659 A.2d 1295 (1995).
Although the court of special appeals implied that some of the pollution at
the Site was intentional, it held that American Motorists was still required to
defend ARTRA on the potentiality-of-coverage rule because "at least some"
of the contamination was not expected or intended. Id. See supra notes 22,
27-28 (discussing potentiality of coverage).
301. 607 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill. 1992).
302. See id. at 1220-22.
303. See supra notes 39, 42, 55, 68.
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V. CONCLUSION
Rather than harmonizing Maryland's obsolescent contractual
choice-of-law doctrine with modern and enlightened approaches, the
American Motorists court has simply added confusion to this legal
morass.3° Maryland's adoption of a "limited renvoi exception" to
its stated doctrine of lex loci contractus is, at best, a halfway step
towards adoption of the interest analysis approach of the Second
Restatement. 05 In this case, however, going halfway is not better
than not going at all because this position is prejudicial to the
interests of parties from other states in Maryland litigation.3°0 To
balance the goals of consistency, predictability, uniformity, and most
importantly, fairness in resolving legal conflicts, the court of appeals
must either fully adopt the approach of the Second Restatement or
return to the well-established doctrine of lex loci contractus.307
In addition, although the American Motorists court swayed with
the prevailing wind in determining that an insurer has no duty under
a CGL policy to pay the costs of cleaning up an insured's pollution,
the court did not address the historical development of the insurance
policy, an issue of key importance in this ongoing battle between
insurers and insured.308 The court of appeals held that insurance
coverage is precluded except for damages resulting from instantaneous
or short-lived, and unintended and unexpected releases of pollution. 3°9
Although the holding is consistent with the decisions of a significant
number of other states3 10 it fails to address the role of the insurers'
intent in drafting the policy language. 31' Additionally, the temporal
component of "sudden" is difficult to conclusively establish.3 12 De-
spite the apparent negligence of the policyholder in carelessly dis-
posing of toxic wastes,31 3 the interpretation of the policy which is
most consistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured is
that coverage should be precluded only where the release of the
pollution is merely unintended and unexpected rather than abrupt or
instantaneous as well as unintended and unexpected. 3 4 Hopefully,
the court of appeals will revisit this issue and determine the role of
304. See supra notes 93, 95-174, 184, 236-75.
305. See supra notes 261-64 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 272-75 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 251-57 and accompanying text.
308. See supra notes 33, 34, 36, 42 and accompanying text.
309. See supra notes 225-29 and accompanying text.
310. See supra note 55.
311. See supra notes 33, 34, 36, 42, 68 and accompanying text.
312. See supra notes 44-69, 278-82 and accompanying text.
313. See supra note 294.
314. See supra notes 33, 34, 36, 42, 68, 282 and accompanying text.
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the insurers' intent and the reasonable expectations of policy holders
in interpreting this language.
Douglas I. Wood
